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SUMMARY 
Pakistan currently hosts up to three million Afghans, 
a number that is likely to increase due to the Taliban's 
recent return to power in Afghanistan. This working 
paper is based on empirical research on the experience 
of Afghan displacement in Pakistan from 2019 until 
early 2021 as part of the European Union funded  
TRAFIG project. 
Findings show that Afghans’ protracted displacement 
is classed. Many low-skilled, low-income and largely 
non-educated Afghans experience barriers to upward 
social mobility, particularly leading the Afghan youth to 
consider migrating to Europe. First-generation Afghan 
refugees who migrated mainly in the 1980s and 1990s 
prefer to stay in Pakistan; only few would return if the 
conditions allowed it. While aiming to incentivise re-
turn, Pakistani government policies hamper the oppor-
tunity for Afghans to move around within and beyond 
Pakistan and remain connected to their translocal and 
transnational networks. Many Afghan refugees have 
family members who live in other parts of Pakistan or 
in other countries, but the potential of these networks 
to lift those in Pakistan out of protracted displacement is 
limited. We also found that social cohesion between 
Afghan refugees and the Pakistani host society has 
been decreasing. Local networks are highly significant 
in day-to-day life, but intergroup relations do not yield 
any emancipatory potential for Afghans. 
Afghans’ presence in Pakistan needs to be reconsidered 
by all actors, namely the country of origin, host and 
donor countries. The current approach of ‘administer-
ing Afghans’ keeps them in protracted displacement 
without the opportunity to integrate legally or sus-
tainably. It needs to be replaced with a new narrative 
and operational approach—one that acknowledges 
Afghans’ contributions to Pakistan’s economy, society 
and culture, and that secures their right to remain in 
Pakistan. Such an approach is particularly important 
today given the looming prospect of more Afghans 
entering Pakistan to escape from living under a govern-
ment headed by the Taliban.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
Afghans have not contributed anything positive 
to society. Whenever something happens, it is 
attributed to Afghans, especially concerning the 
law-and-order situation. In one way or another, 
Afghans can be put in relation to the offenders, 
even if they only act as the transporters of the 
latter. The justification of their stay is no longer 
logical after 40 years (EI-BICC-KM-003-Pak).
This working paper describes and analyses empirical data that 
have been collected in Pakistan in the framework of the project 
“Transnational Figurations of Displacement” (TRAFIG), 
funded by the European Union and coordinated by BICC (Bonn 
International Center for Conversion). The overall objective of 
TRAFIG is “to contribute to the development of alternative 
solutions to protracted displacement that are better tailored to 
the needs and capacities of persons affected by displacement” 
(Etzold et al., 2019). The main question that our research aims 
to answer is: How are protractedness, dependency and vulner-
ability related to factors of local and translocal connectivity 
and mobility, and, in turn, how can connectivity and mobility 
be utilised to enhance displaced people’s self-reliance and 
strengthen their resilience? In this working paper, we focus on 
findings from Pakistan, a country that at the time of writing 
hosts up to three million Afghans (see Section 2 for details) and 
where new flows of refugees can be expected due to the take-
over of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan in August 2021. 
The quote above sketches the increasingly negative perceptions 
of Afghans in Pakistan that shape an overall adverse context 
that the displaced have to navigate. The discrimination and de 
facto forced repatriation since 2015 that many Afghans face 
reflects their increasing rejection in Pakistan. However, the 
quote can also be read as a call for urgency to scrutinise the 
established regional and national refugee regimes concerning 
Afghans. Accordingly, we need to rethink Afghans’ presence 
in Pakistan. The current approach of ‘administering Afghans’ 
and thus also keeping them in protracted displacement needs 
to be replaced with a new narrative and operational approach 
for framing Afghans’ presence in Pakistan that acknowledges 
Afghans’ contributions to Pakistan’s economy, society, and 
culture, that secures their rights and contributes to a sustainable 
solution to their protracted displacement. This is even more rel-
evant at the time of writing given the looming prospect of more 
Afghans entering Pakistan to escape living under a government 
headed by the Taliban.     
In the following sections, we first provide more detail on 
the empirical design of the study, its limitations and some 
background on how the data collection processes unfolded in 
practice, including the challenges we encountered. Section 2 
provides a sketch of the figuration of displacement in Pakistan 
and how this has developed over time. Section 3 consists of the 
main body of our paper and analyses the empirical data in ref-
erence to the five main themes of TRAFIG. Thus, sub-section 
3.1 looks into governance regimes of aid and asylum as they 
apply in Pakistan and how Afghans are subjected to them, and 
how major types of stakeholders navigate these regimes in their 
national, organisational and personal interests. Sub-section 3.2 
revolves around the theme ‘living in limbo’ and analyses how 
Afghans sustain their lives and livelihoods but also to what 
extent they can escape from uncertainty. It highlights how 
class relations impact the social mobility prospects of Afghans 
in Pakistan. Sub-section 3.3 follows the networks of Afghans 
and looks into the role of people’s connections for social and 
physical mobility, including a special excursus on mobility 
constraints of Afghans in Iran. Sub-section 3.4 investigates how 
Afghans in Pakistan build alliances in their immediate environ-
ment and the extent to which these facilitate their de facto local 
integration. Sub-section 3.5 briefly sketches out under which 
conditions Afghans can seize opportunities and identifies sec-
tors where Afghans achieve a considerable economic impact for 
the host country. Finally, section 4 discusses some cross-cut-
ting findings and other emerging themes that resulted from 
our research. Amongst others, we pay attention to gendered 
immobilisation, how legal status and protection play out differ-
ently for people from different social classes,1  Afghan youth’s 
outlook on the future and their vulnerability under conditions 
of COVID-19. In the concluding section, we provide a short 
summary of our main findings related to the notion of translocal 
figurations of displacement. We also discuss the conditions 
under which connectivity and mobility could help Afghans find 
a durable way to move out of protracted displacement. 
1 Social class is understood here as multidimensional concept based on the 
scope and mixture of capitals, including economic, social  and cultural capital, 
held by individuals. The concept includes practices by which people signify 
class belonging and reproduce class relations (Bonjour & Chauvin, 2018). For 
the purpose of this paper, the conceptual underpinnings cannot be explored. 
However, the case of Afghan refugees (cf. Grawert & Mielke, 2018) and 
implications for class relations and social mobility constitutes a productive re-
search gap (cf. sub-section 4.2 on ‘classed protractedness’). The terminology 
lower class, middle class, upper class is not meant pejoratively but serves as a 
shorthand for difficult-to-establish differences between individuals and social 
groups in terms of income and wealth as well as education and levels of skill.
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SHARP was instrumental in choosing the research sites and 
focused on marginalised and poor communities of Afghans in 
places such as Pul Saggian, Lahore, (see the introduction of 
sub-section 3.2 for details) that had been one of the previous 
focus communities of SHARP and covered by several surveys 
for aid and other measures. One sub-cluster in Jhangabad, with 
15 resettled households hailing from Mianwali refugee camp in 
Punjab, was a comparable site in Karachi. In Islamabad and  
Karachi, the team contacted key persons of the respective Afghan 
communities and administration to support our research work. 
1.2	Sampling	and	data	collection
Before we started collecting the data, our team held a method- 
ology workshop in Islamabad in December 2019. The team 
operationalised the interview questions for use on-site and  
carried out pilot interviews, which were the basis for adjusting 
the semi-structured interview guide to researchers’ and respond-
ents’ needs. At the start of data collection, SHARP held talks 
with key people (leaders) of Afghan communities to ensure 
support of the research (e.g., in identifying respondents for 
interviews) in all sites. To a similar extent, we used walk-alongs 
in areas populated by Afghans and asked around to identify 
respondents. To triangulate our findings and to be able to assess 
to what extent refugees’ experience of displacement differs 
from that of other migrants and non-displaced people, we also 
talked informally with respondents from the host community. 
During data collection, the researchers began conducting 
semi-structured interviews first, followed by biographical 
interviews and the quantitative survey. We carried out expert 
interviews throughout the entire research collection period 
from late 2019 until March 2020. The first phase of fieldwork 
took place in December 2019, with initial interviews, including 
expert interviews, in Lahore and Karachi. From spring 2020 
This working paper is based on empirical findings of research 
in four different regions of Pakistan. In the following, we 
provide more detail on the research team, the choice of research 
sites, sampling, planning, our approach to data analysis and the 
challenges we faced during the study. For an overview of the 
different methods used, see the overview infographic and Table 
1 below. This working paper mainly relies on semi-structured 
qualitative interviews and quantitative data from the survey in 
Pakistan. Overall, 386 people participated in our research in 
Pakistan and 15 in Iran. 
1.1	Research	team	and	location
The research team initially aimed to conduct research in rural 
(i.e., camp or so-called refugee villages) and urban/ peri-urban 
(non-camp) settings in Pakistan. Of the registered Afghans in 
Pakistan, 31 per cent—444,439 people as of February 2021—
live in mostly rural camps (so-called refugee villages) located 
in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (46 per cent), Baluchistan 
province (15 per cent) and Punjab province (10 per cent). The 
majority of Afghans, i.e. 69 per cent or 990,947 persons as of 
February 2021, live in urban or peri-urban areas outside of 
camps. Access restrictions to the selected camp in Punjab meant 
that the team was not able to cover camp locations. Furthermore, 
qualitative data collection through semi-structured interviews 
the team had planned was not made possible in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, thus limiting the qualitative insights to a few 
expert interviews. However, within the survey, the team covered 
60 respondents in Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa. Security considerations also rendered research 
in Baluchistan (Quetta)—the province with the second-highest 
number of Afghan residents—impossible, not least because of 
the risk of getting exposed to terrorist attacks and/ or security 
operations. As a result, the research conducted for this working 
paper has its limitations in terms of spatial representativeness. 
1.	Empirical	design	and	limitations	of	the	study		
Type	of	interview	 Pakistan Iran	
Lahore Karachi Peshawar Islamabad other Total
Biographic 3 7
Expert 3 1 1 13 10 23
Semi-structured 13 32 2 8 7 5 62
Survey 82 75 60 65 17 299
Total no. of participants 102 108 62 77 37 401
Table	1:	Overview	of	research	methods	employed	in	this	study
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onwards, the COVID-19 pandemic expanded, and our plans for 
data collection were stalled. In the following months, we only 
held a few interviews, mainly at the place of residence of the 
researchers (Islamabad). Throughout 2020-21, we interviewed 
experts mostly virtually (13 out of 18 in Pakistan). We analysed 
the qualitative interview data by using MAXQDA, a qualitative 
data analysis software based on deductive (initial TRAFIG 
coding tree) and inductive coding.  
In September 2020, the research team prepared for the second 
phase of data collection and conducted another workshop for 
preparing the survey. In the survey, we covered Islamabad 
(Katchi Abadi I-12, Shahzad Town and Golra Mor, three 
neighbourhoods with a large Afghan population), Peshawar 
(Khazana Camp and Haji Camp, both former refugee camps 
which turned to permanent settlements for Afghan refugees), 
Mardan, Lahore (Pul Saggian, Davis Road and Ittefaq Town) 
and last Karachi (Jhangabad and Al-Asif Square) between 
October 2020 and March 2021.
1.3	Limitations	of	the	study	and	fieldwork	
challenges
We cannot claim that the data we obtained in the course of this 
research is representative given the size of the Afghan communi-
ty and at least two structural limitations: 
1.	 While we took efforts to interview as many women as 
possible, the overall number of female respondents we could 
reach is disproportionate to male research participants (we 
conducted 15 out of 62 semi-structured interviews and 
two out of seven biographic interviews with women; for 
the survey, we were able to reach a higher share of 48 per 
cent female respondents). This has to do with traditional 
power and representation patterns within Afghan com-
munities meshed with cultural codes that forbid, e.g. male 
researchers’ access to Afghan women for interviews. With 
only one female researcher and one female data manager 
involved in semi-structured and survey interviews, we had 
to acknowledge this limitation. 
2.	 The data reflects mainly the situation of UNHCR-registered 
Afghans (those having proof of registration [PoR] cards) 
and thus a group enjoying basic protection.2  This focus is a 
consequence of the team’s limited access to undocumented 
2 In our survey sample of 299 Afghans, six per cent stated that they were not 
registered at all, whilst 94 per cent said that they are currently registered in 
Pakistan. Of the registered Afghans, the vast majority (87 per cent) possessed 
a proof of registration (PoR) card, a minority (10 per cent) had an Afghan 
citizen card (ACC, providing basic temporary protection against non-refoule-
ment). Very few indicated to have both cards, or none of these.
Afghans based on SHARP’s exclusive dealing with regis-
tered Afghans, the politicisation and sensitivity surrounding 
the existence of undocumented Afghans in Pakistan, their 
efforts to blend in and not be detected, etc. The direct 
insights we could gain about the situation of undocumented 
Afghans stem from interviews that occurred by chance and 
reports of registered Afghans about non-registered family 
members as well as expert interviews. 
One main challenge in practical fieldwork was managing the 
expectations of Afghan respondents in the field. Afghans in  
Pakistan are generally quite suspicious and expect that respond-
ing to visitors who ask questions will bring certain material 
or financial benefits. In addition, previous surveys by SHARP 
and other organisations at sites chosen for the TRAFIG survey 
registered names of people for aid purposes during needs assess-
ments. Thus, asking vulnerable people questions for semi-struc-
tured interviews (SSI) or in the course of the survey almost 
inevitably led to expectations about aid and a possible distortion 
of answers. This is exacerbated when written consent forms and 
gadgets are used for SSIs. We quickly realised that using tablets 
for meta-data collection during interviews was not conducive as 
it raises the profile of the interview exercise and related expec-
tations. Internet connectivity constituted a major problem, too. 
Therefore, the research team tried to keep a low profile, e.g. by 
not using tablets on the spot and mostly resorting to oral consent 
and not recording interviews. Thus, the team adapted its research 
work to the environment in each case and obtained approximate-
ly 50 per cent written and 50 per cent oral consent from respond-
ents. In addition, the research team took detailed notes on paper 
during the interviews, digitalised the metadata and elaborated 
on their notes, writing up interview reports as soon as possible 
after each interview had ended. Another factor exacerbating the 
circumstances of working with respondents was the security sit-
uation for staff and equipment in so-called remote areas, which 
was raised by local police, who urged the team to leave certain 
areas before sunset.
For expert interviews carried out in 2020-21 through remote 
interviewing, i.e., via phone, skype or Zoom, oral consent turned 
out to be feasible. 
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support by the United States and the USSR to warring factions 
and client regimes, and ideological framings influenced the 
trajectory of conflict and attempts to bring peace and create the 
precondition for mitigating protracted displacement. Throughout 
the decade of the Soviet military intervention (1979–89),  
3.1 million Afghans fled to Pakistan (50 per cent of the respond-
ents in our survey first fled during this time (see Figure 1)), 
between 1.7 million and 2.2 million to Iran, and 1.5 million  
to 2.2 million were internally displaced, totalling between  
6.3 million and 7.3 million displaced persons. This number, plus 
the Afghans moving to third countries such as Germany, the 
United States and Australia, amounted to about one-third of the 
entire estimated Afghan population at the onset of conflict.
Displacement did not end with the withdrawal of Soviet military 
forces by early 1989. On the contrary, several waves of displace-
ment and return continue to occur, thereby establishing circular 
movement patterns and translocal lives over time. While in mid- 
2001, UNHCR estimated that two million Afghans were living 
in Pakistan (see Figure 1), return numbers after 2001 were much 
higher than that even though the 1990s had been heralded as a 
decade of repatriation.
A 2005 census in Pakistan showed that four years into the repa-
triation decade, still more than three million Afghans were living 
in Pakistan, thus indicating how previous estimates were far 
too low (Kronenfeld, 2008). While from April to August 2021, 
another re-verification of the number of registered Afghans in 
Pakistan is planned, the distinction between their ‘refugee-ness’ 
and other/ mixed motives that caused them to emigrate is note-
worthy and relevant for any solution. Thus, what Kronenfeld 
pointed out in 2011, has not lost relevance to date: 
The legal categories that define refugees and returnees do 
not necessarily describe Afghans and their neighbors as 
they live, move, work, and intermix along Afghanistan’s 
borders. Refugee and returnee movements are and have 
been part of larger social and economic processes that 
Afghans have engaged in and developed for generations if 
not centuries. This has been both a source of strength and 
a weakness for Afghans. On the one hand, this mobility 
has given them an important tool for coping with adver-
sity. On the other, however, it has clouded their legal 
status, making it difficult to provide for their protection 
and search for durable solutions. Many of these people 
are neither refugees nor returnees, strictly speaking, and 
neither permanent local resettlement nor permanent  
refugee return are entirely appropriate outcomes (p. 15). 
With more than 2.7 million registered refugees (2020), Afghans 
constitute the second-largest refugee population in the world 
after Syrians. One in eight refugees worldwide is from Afghan-
istan. Afghan displacement constitutes the main protracted 
displacement situation in South Asia; it has been going on for 
more than 40 years. In 2020, asylum seekers from Afghanistan 
filed the highest number of asylum applications globally, a total 
of 246,000 applications in 80 countries. The majority of Afghans 
abroad live in the region. As of late July 2021, there are up to 2.3 
million documented Afghans in Pakistan (with UNHCR or the 
government of Pakistan). The number of undocumented  
migrants brings the number up to more than three million Af-
ghans,3  which is 1.4 per cent of the total population of Pakistan  
(207.7 million according to GoP, 2017).4  
Figure	1:	Number	of	Afghan	refugees	registered	in	Pakistan	
and	year	of	TRAFIG	survey	respondents’	arrival	in	Pakistan
While a high level of mobility and connectivity had character-
ised the region historically, mass displacement set in after the 
1978 Marxist coup d’état and the Soviet intervention in December 
1979, which triggered armed resistance and large-scale violence. 
In the context of the Cold War, the proxy conflict involved 
3 The number of up to 2.3 million documented Afghans consists of those 
registered as refugees (1.4 million, see UNHCR, n.d.) plus 879,198 previously 
undocumented migrants that applied for Afghan citizen cards (ACC) with 
Pakistani authorities in 2017-18 (IOM, 2019, p. 13). The figure of an additional 
one million undocumented Afghans is a medium estimate established from a 
range of sources, e.g., IOM refers to half a million undocumented in the same 
source, ECHO (2017) to one million in 2017. 
4 See UNHCR data for an overview of Afghan refugees (data available since 
1979), asylum seekers (data available since 2000) and IDPs (data available since 
1993) at https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=doVT7X,
2.	Protracted	displacement	in	Pakistan
Source:  TRAFIG survey (n=299; frequency of responses), UNCHR data as of 
December 2020 (https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/down-
load/?url=BiRkn4)
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Responses to why Afghans left their country of origin in the 
TRAFIG survey reveal mixed drivers of mobility from Afghan-
istan. Ninety-three per cent of respondents indicated that one of 
their motivations was insecurity, war and violence. Half of our 
respondents also said that they had to leave Afghanistan due to 
economic factors such as unemployment and loss of livelihoods, 
often linked to violent conflict and insecurity. Military service or 
forced inscription (12 per cent), conflicts over land (7 per cent) 
and political persecution from the government or other groups 
such as the Taliban (7 per cent) were also mentioned and are 
linked to the lack of security, rights and transitional justice in 
Afghanistan (see Figure 2).
In Pakistan, 69 per cent of the registered Afghans live outside 
camps (so-called Afghan refugee villages/ ARVs) in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province, Baluchistan and Punjab, where the 
ARV population is said to have access to health, education, 
water and sanitation services. Overall, the majority of Afghans 
in Pakistan live in the border province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(58.1 per cent/ 834,387 individuals), followed by 22.8 per cent 
or 327,247 Afghans registered in Baluchistan (bordering  
Afghanistan in the south), Punjab (11.7 per cent, 168,351),  
4.6 per cent in Sindh (66,111) and 2.4 per cent or 35,003  
Afghans who live in the Federal Capital Territory of Islamabad 
(UNHCR, 2021, as of 31 January 2021).
According to UNHCR, 4.38 million Afghan refugees were vol-
untarily repatriated by its programmes between 2002 and 2018, 
a much higher number than the estimates for initially displaced 
Afghans to Pakistan. As Monsutti & Balcı (2014) pointed out, 
“the sustainability and veracity of such a large return movement 
is questionable.” It can only be made sense of if circular mi-
gration movements—which correspond to pre-war traditional 
migration patterns (seasonal labour, trade, nomadism)—are 
factored in, including ‘recycling’ across the border to receive 
cash grants in assisted return programmes more than once. 
The peak in voluntary return numbers was reached in 2016 
when 381,275 Afghans left Pakistan in what experts call 
mass-refoulement.5  This process of leaving was supported 
by UNHCR (HRW, 2017) after the government of Pakistan 
launched restrictive policies against Afghans as a consequence 
of terrorist and other attacks falsely blamed on Afghans. In 
comparison, voluntary repatriation in 2020 amounted to 1,125 
cases only. Repatriation figures were high when the political 
situation in Afghanistan seemed hopeful but decreased after 
2005. More than 9,000 Afghans were resettled from Pakistan 
to third countries between 2003 and 2021; five countries alone 
accepted 8,952 of all resettled Afghans from Pakistan, namely 
the United States (4,429), Australia (3,089), Canada (873), New 
Zealand (445) and Sweden (107).6  Since 2019, however, options 
for resettlement have been almost zero after a peak in 2016 with 
2,061 persons resettled. 
5 Refoulement of refugees and asylum seekers denotes the removal of a person 
to a place where “their life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion” (UNHCR 2005, 444). The principle of non-refoulement is key 
to international protection of refugees, and because it is part of customary 
international law, all states, including those which are not signatories of the 
1951 Refugee Convention, like Pakistan, are bound to it.
6 cf. https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#Kn4H for key figures on resettlement of Afghans 
from Pakistan between 2003 until early 2021.
Figure	2:	Most	important	reasons	for	departure	from	Afghanistan	
Source:  TRAFIG survey (n=299; frequency of responses, multiple answers 
were possible)
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determination (RSD) procedures, and received proof-of-regis-
tration (PoR) cards7 that entitle their holders as Afghan citizens 
to reside legally and temporarily on Pakistani soil and thus 
protect against refoulement. The number of undocumented 
Afghans in Pakistan is estimated to be around 500,000 to  
1.5 million people (IOM, 2019, p. 13). They are not protected 
and subject to the Foreigners Act (1946) provisions that foresee 
detainment and deportation upon being caught in Pakistan. 
However, undocumented Afghans may try to approach 
UNHCR for RSD (Ferreira, 2020, p. 33) and be issued asylum 
seeker certificates which also protect against refoulement. RSD 
was conducted on a larger scale until 2015 and constituted a 
viable tool for undocumented Afghans to receive asylum-seeker 
and de facto refugee status. However, with the change of policy 
in 2016–17 (cf. section 2), the options for RSD have narrowed. 
As a UNHCR expert in Pakistan stated: 
When refugees get into problems in Pakistan and are 
unable to return to Afghanistan, they reach out to us, 
and we can register them as asylum seekers issuing the 
asylum seeker certificate. Whether or not they will go 
through the whole process of RSD is then still to be seen. 
Since RSD is highly resource-intensive, UNHCR needs to 
balance where the RSD tool is most beneficial. […] Those 
reaching out to us for asylum are non-PoR card holders, 
i.e., Afghan citizen card holders, in case they have inter-
national protection needs or are undocumented Afghans. 
The total number of Afghans with asylum-seeker status 
as of 31 October 2020 was 3,011, out of a total of 9,723 
asylum seekers from all countries in Pakistan (EI-BICC-
KM-011-Pak). 
Resettlement options have narrowed even more in recent years 
and are now close to zero (cf. section 2). It is no surprise to see 
that 94 per cent of our survey respondents have never applied or 
been suggested for resettlement to another country. Of the  
18 people who had applied or were suggested for resettlement 
(to the United States and Canada), nine reported that a final 
decision was still pending, six noted that their application 
had been rejected, and the remaining three did not know their 
status. 
Complementing the Tripartite Agreement since 2012 is the 
so-called Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), a 
regional policy framework between Iran, Pakistan, Afghani-
stan and UNHCR for cooperation between humanitarian and 
7 PoR cards are issued by the National Database and Registration Authority 
(NADRA) to all registered Afghans over five years of age whereas those under 
five are listed on the card of the mother or the head of the family.
This section presents our empirical research findings. It 




This sub-section looks into Theme 1 of TRAFIG: ‘Navigating 
through governance regimes of aid and asylum’. The main 
question this sub-section aims to address is: How do displaced 
people gain access to, make use of, and are governed by policies 
and programmes in the fields of humanitarian aid, development 
and protection? 
Frameworks of protection for displaced Afghans
As Pakistan is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and has also not 
enacted any national legislation to protect refugees, all govern- 
ment institutions, UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders such 
as (I)NGOs dealing with Afghans in Pakistan and Afghans 
themselves navigate in legal limbo. The governance of Af-
ghans in Pakistan is characterised by two main features. It first 
distinguishes registered Afghans (in common parlance termed 
‘refugees’) from illegal aliens (undocumented Afghans), and its 
security policy-driven approach results in unpredictability and 
uncertainty for members of both groups. In the words of one 
legal expert: “The government of Pakistan has never explicitly 
and legally categorised Afghans in Pakistan, neither as refugees 
nor as economic migrants” (EI-BICC-KM-002-Pak). Instead, 
the protection of Afghan ‘refugees’ in Pakistan is rooted in  
administrative arrangements and policies issued by the Pakistani 
government on a non-regular, mostly ad-hoc basis.
The overall framework for governing the stay and repatriation 
of registered Afghans in Pakistan is the Tripartite Agreement 
between UNHCR and the governments of Pakistan and  
Afghanistan. It was initiated in 2003 and is currently extended 
until 2021. The Tripartite Agreement serves as the legal basis 
for UNHCR activities in Pakistan and is based on the agreed-
upon aim of the three main stakeholders to resolve Afghans’ 
protracted displacement situation through a formal process 
of gradual organised return. Since 2003, several policy shifts 
have become visible, always in close relation with regional 
(geo)political developments, most significantly the domestic 
security situation in Pakistan (cf. sub-section 3.4). In a first  
significant move, the distinction of registered vs. undocumented 
Afghans was facilitated by the 2005-census of Afghans in 
Pakistan followed by a registration exercise in 2006–2007. As a 
result, 2.15 million registered Afghans were de facto recognised 
as prima facie refugees, i.e., without undergoing refugee status 
3.	Key	dimensions	of	figurations	of	displacement	in	the	DRC
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development actors to address Afghans’ needs and support their 
repatriation and reintegration process in Afghanistan as the 
desired durable solution. Judging from the interview responses 
in the course of our research, this preferred durable solution by 
policymakers is at odds with the desires of Afghans themselves, 
i.e., their wish to obtain citizenship in Pakistan or be given a 
chance to continue living as Afghans in Pakistan on a valid 
legal basis. As one expert pointed out: “The main problem 
about the SSAR is that it has never been discussed with repre-
sentatives of the affected population groups, i.e., Afghans. It is 
only discussed between three or four departments in Pakistan. 
Thus, no wonder that it remains nothing more than a paper 
tiger. The SSAR is highly artificial, without substance and only 
discussed among the upper echelon of government stakeholders 
and UNHCR” (EI-BICC-KM-005-Pak). Given the described 
distance of the policy, it was found to have only a limited 
meaning for Afghans on the ground (EI-BICC-KM-007-Pak). 
The implementation gap
With the above protection architecture in place, our research 
revealed several fault lines in how policies are implemented and 
set to operate, thus pointing at a gap between policy and practice. 
The gap is tangible in several dimensions: The insufficient  
protection function of PoR cards; the failed attempt to decree a 
National Refugee Law after 2017 linked with the introduction 
of a visa regime and the documentation of unregistered Af-
ghans; the subsequent process of issuing Afghan Citizen Cards 
(ACC) to more than 800,000 undocumented Afghans; and the 
Prime Minister’s announced plan to naturalise Afghans in  
Pakistan that was almost immediately revoked. 
Proof-of-registration (PoR) cards 
Registered Afghans, i.e., PoR card holders, enjoy a de facto 
legal status (that of a refugee, albeit not in the framework of 
the UN 1951 convention and its 1967 protocol) and protection 
for the period of validity of their PoR cards. No other rights 
beyond protection from refoulement are officially connected to 
the status of being a PoR card holder. As one expert explained: 
“The individual PoR card holder was to be considered as  
Afghan citizen temporarily living in Pakistan. Section 3.4 of 
the MoU stipulates that ‘the card does not grant the right of 
work/ employment within Pakistan’” (EI-BICC-KM-013-Pak). 
Social rights—alleged free access to public medical facilities and 
the right to education—are discussed in sub-section 3.2; how-
ever, it is important to note that the special quota for Afghans 
that existed in public sector educational institutions (schools, 
colleges, universities) has been reduced to one per cent only. 
non-citizens have no right to property—in Pakistan categorised 
as a political right. Even renting properties like shops or apart-
ments, houses, storage rooms, etc., has become increasingly 
difficult in Punjab after the provincial government passed The 
Punjab Information of Temporary Residents Act in 2015 that re-
quires landlords to register every tenant in a cumbersome pro-
cedure with the local police and enacts severe punishments and 
high fines for not observing the law (Javed, 2019, pp. 11–15). In 
effect, Pakistani house owners in Punjab and Islamabad Capital 
Territory (ICT) have become very reluctant to rent to Afghans. 
Their reluctance has only increased since counter-terrorism 
measures and criminal investigations targeted Pakistani house 
owners after the National Action Plan (NAP, cf. NACTA, 2014) 
was announced following the attack on a Peshawar army public 
school in December 2014. While these are all indirectly linked 
with the PoR card holder status, the actual protection gap is 
directly linked with the validity of the PoR card. Since their 
official expiry on 30 December 2015, the cards were extended 
irregularly by written government notifications for one to 
twelve months, often with delays (Mielke, 2019, pp. 34–35). 
One expert reflected on this policy as follows: “The PoR cards, 
meant to be a protection instrument, are de facto not protecting 
their holders effectively because of the government’s haphazard 
policies, meaning the delays and blockages in extending the 
validity of the cards” (EI-BICC-KM-005-Pak). From 30 June 
2020 onward, when the last extension ran out, there have been 
unprecedented delays in extending the PoR cards' validity. This 
had serious repercussions for Afghans in Pakistan on their ac-
cess to health and education institutions, renting arrangements 
and mobility, not least because without extension, they face 
increased risks of arbitrary detention and arrest.  
While an element of surveillance (Alimia, 2019) is already 
tangible in the Punjab Information of Temporary Residents 
Act 2015, the ongoing  PoR card Document Renewal and 
Information Verification Exercise (DRIVE) from April 2021 
onwards represents another step by the GoP to achieve clarity 
as to which Afghans live in Pakistan’s territory. Supported by 
UNHCR, the National Database and Registration Authority 
(NADRA) has started to issue one million high- technology 
smart cards for Afghan PoR-holders and newborns and thereby 
successively extends their registration until the end of 2023. 
The smart cards are said to 
be more technologically advanced than the previous PoR 
cards, more secure, long-living, and to contain a chip with 
biodata comprising fingerprints of all ten fingers and a facial 
recognition system but excluding iris scan. The chip is linked 
to centralised data management in NADRA. The idea is to 
register information about Afghans’ bank accounts and SIM 
card numbers on the smart card. In contrast to earlier regis-
tration exercises, the government hopes to get an overview 
of the development of skill sets of Afghan refugees between 
2010 and 2020 and about the type of support the govern-
ment extended to Afghan refugees over the years. New is 
also a family ID that will be introduced for legal assistance; 
thus family data is to be improved; besides, other data to 
be obtained includes family linkages, tehsil [district] level/ 
origin of Afghans, skills, protection needs and disabilities” 
(EI-BICC-KM-013-Pak). 
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process was extended three times: Until 30 April 2019, then  
31 October 2019 and lastly until 30 June 2020. Since then, ACC 
and the PoR card extension is pending a Cabinet decision. Sev-
eral experts interviewed during our research stated that the in-
troduction of ACC was mainly motivated by security concerns, 
“to identify potential Afghan terrorist and suicide bombers” 
(EI-BICC-KM-004-Pak, government worker) or the need to 
investigate who is residing on Pakistani territory linked to the 
National Action Plan (NAP) financial taskforce activities and 
Pakistan’s international listing as a terrorism financing state 
(EI-BICC-KM-012-Pak, employed in an international organi-
sation). Another expert commented: “After the Pakistan Army 
school attack in Peshawar, the government of Pakistan was keen 
to know ‘who lives on our territory’ and to get biometric infor-
mation of all residents” (EI-BICC-KM-011-Pak, employed in an 
international organisation). Meanwhile, a deadlock in the ACC 
process and the related regularisation of Afghans’ visas for 
staying in Pakistan is manifest. While the GoA is claiming that 
the GoP changed its policy and would now insist that Afghans 
first repatriate and get their Pakistani visas issued in Afghani-
stan rather than in Pakistan, the GoP blames the GoA for lack of 
capacities to issue Afghan passports inside Pakistan (EI-BICC-
KM-010-Pak, EI-BICC-KM-011-Pak), claiming: “They should 
have upgraded their personnel and technical infrastructure” 
(EI-BICC-KM-013-Pak, GoP worker). 
As a result of the unsuccessful and, at best, partial implemen-
tation of the 2017 Afghan Refugee Management Policy, the 
ACC process is unresolved and uncertain. While at least more 
than 800,000 Afghans had been temporarily protected against 
refoulement due to the ACC registration, the fact that the visa 
regime was put in place in the north-western border checkpoint 
Torkham meant that Afghans could and can no longer enter 
Pakistan via this checkpoint without a proper visa and passport. 
At the same time, the other major border crossing in Baluchistan, 
Chaman border crossing, is still open for unchecked entry. 
Moreover, the National Refugee Law was not issued even 
though federal and provincial task forces had been established 
to work on the draft law, which was eventually shared with 
all ministries and provincial governments and supposed to 
be passed in January 2018. Two reasons were reported why 
the law never came into being: On the one hand, security 
concerns due to Pakistan’s porous border with Afghanistan 
were mentioned and that a refugee law would make Pakistan 
vulnerable to a strong inflow of potential refugees of diverse 
origins, as reflected in this quote: “We are unable to manage the 
refugee population. If we had a law, many people would come, 
including Somalis and others” (EI-BICC-KM-005-Pak). On 
the other, experts pointed out that Pakistani policymakers and 
bureaucrats fail to understand displacement-protection issues 
and the realities and needs of Afghans (EI-BICC-KM-005-Pak). 
The objective to take account of skill-set development and  
received government support is in line with the SSAR frame-
work in its latest version that emphasizes the alleged needs 
of Afghans and the best possible preparation of Afghans in 
Pakistan for their return to Afghanistan, that is giving them 
the skills they would need for (re)integration after their return. 
This policy is based on the assumption that education and skills 
development contribute to sustainable repatriation and prevent 
re-migration as has been the case until now (cf. sub-section 3.3). 
The policy completely eclipses the security and livelihood 
situation in Afghanistan.  
Afghan Refugee Management Policy
Another telling example where policy implementation failed 
is Pakistan’s Afghan Refugee Management Policy (ARMP) 
that the Cabinet adopted in February 2017. It consisted of three 
components: 1) the introduction of a visa regime for Afghans, 
including its implementation at the border crossings; 2) the  
documentation of all non-registered Afghans in Pakistan; and  
3) a national refugee law. Acknowledging that not all Afghans 
in Pakistan are refugees, the government of Pakistan (GoP) 
opted to introduce different categories of visas after Afghani-
stan and Pakistan decided to end the unchecked passage of their 
common border (SHARP, 2019, p. 32, 4). The initial idea was 
to have Afghans apply from where they are based in Pakistan 
for a business/ investor visa, student visa, skilled/ unskilled 
labour visa, or inter-marriages/ family visa upon recommenda-
tion or with a support letter of a Pakistani institution or citizen. 
Reportedly, the Afghan government had assured Afghans in 
Pakistan that it would issue them passports by 31 March 2017 
as a precondition for Afghans’ ability to apply for a visa inside 
Pakistan (with the Commissionerates/ CARs). 
Afghan Citizen Cards
At the same time, the GoP initiated the documentation of 
undocumented Afghans to make them eligible for applying for 
visas, too. Thus, between August 2017 and April 2018, 879,198 
undocumented Afghans registered to receive Afghan Citizen 
Cards (ACC) (IOM, 2019, p. 13) with a validity of six months—
the period thought necessary for each ACC holder to obtain an 
Afghan passport and eventually a Pakistani visa (EI-BICC-
KM-003-Pak). Since the basis of the ACC dissemination was an 
MoU between the government of Afghanistan (GoA) and GoP, 
the ACC-holders are under the sole mandate of the GoP. 
While ACC cards were advertised to raise awareness among 
refugees, their benefits were not made explicit. Many Afghans 
feared ‘punishment’, disadvantages and increased risk of depor-
tation if they registered for ACC (EI-BICC-KM-012-Pak), while 
others hoped to obtain long-term legal status. However, the 
protection status of ACC was clearly limited to protection from 
refoulement for the period of its validity. After the schedule did 
not work out as anticipated initially, the validity of ACCs and 
thus the period to receive passports and start a visa application 
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and is still able to operate. In contrast, other organisations had 
to close down, e.g. Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) or the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Baluchis- 
tan.9  As one observer pointed out: “UNHCR has supported 
SAFRON and the CCARs hugely in the past; the CARs are 
still supported by UNHCR with staff salaries. The corruption 
element is omnipresent.” He discussed how gadgets, vehicles 
and salaries that are all financed by UNHCR create vested 
interests for people in government offices, and he estimated that 
20 per cent of the funding for UNHCR “go to waste this way”. 
The possible existence of vested interests in maintaining the 
status quo was also articulated by other respondents in the 
expert interviews and—remarkably—corroborated by two 
experts who are or have been part of the government’s refugee 
administration machine (EI-BICC-KM-003-Pak; EI-BICC-
KM-012-Pak). Accordingly, one former CAR member pointed 
out how under the military leadership of Zia-ul-Haq, refugees 
were brought and accommodated because it served Zia’s  
own personal gains. He went on to say: “The same situation is  
still prevalent today. Refugees serve personal interests of 
particular individuals. I have been part of this, supporting this” 
(EI-BICC-KM-003-Pak). Others spoke of many Pakistani non-
govern- mental profit-seeking organisations with agenda-driven 
funding. Given that the sustainability of measures in fields 
like education, training and awareness-raising poses one of the 
greatest challenges, not least because government officers get 
regularly transferred and counterparts change, there is always 
the need to train new staff and to provide awareness-raising 
sessions again, which require an endless amount of funding 
(EI-BICC-KM-012-Pak). 
Another expert criticised the fact that the GoP has not decreed 
a sound refugee policy or respective laws and interprets this 
to mean “that the government probably wants the situation of 
Afghan refugees in the country to remain as it is” (EI-BICC-
KM-016-Pak). Given that Afghans are not treated on human-
itarian grounds but as objects in a game of political interests 
between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan and a 
donor community, there are indications of a certain degree of 
refugee rentierism (Tsourapas, 2019; Micinski, 2021) involved 
at different levels of governance. 
Navigating legal limbo: The role of legal assistance 
Against the background of legal limbo, insufficient policies 
and implementation gaps identified above, Afghans have no 
choice but to navigate this adverse legal environment. Here we 
present Afghan migrants’ strategies and practices that result 
from the insecurity of their legal status. The insecurity and 
9 As part of the difficult political context in Pakistan, international NGOs face 
severe registration issues, mistrust, and suspicion by the GoP causing many to 
cease operation in the country.
Granting of citizenship to long-term residents.
This lack of understanding of Afghans’ protracted displacement 
situation has also hampered the option of local integration via 
granting citizenship to long-term non-citizen residents in Paki-
stan. When the new Prime Minister, Imran Khan, announced 
in February 2019 that he would grant Pakistani citizenship 
to Afghans and stateless people in Pakistan, he immediately 
faced strong opposition from various political groups inside the 
country who feared refusal of their local voters’ support  
(EI-BICC-KM-005-Pak). As one expert explained, 
The Citizenship Act of Pakistan says in one clause that 
everybody who was born in Pakistan is entitled to obtain 
Pakistani citizenship. However, the important condition is 
that the newborn’s father also has to be Pakistani. Thus, 
the clause does not apply to Afghans. For Afghans, section 
10 should be initiated that says after ten years of having 
lived in Pakistan, a person is eligible to apply for citizen-  
ship. Many Afghans have been in Pakistan for 40 years 
already. Again, for the government, it is difficult to issue 
any type of statement regarding the citizenship issue 
because it lacks the overall authority in the country 
(EI-BICC-KM-005-Pak). 
Subsequently, a Citizenship Act Amendment Bill that was 
brought into the National Assembly in 2019 was likewise 
rejected due to security concerns.8  The prospect of getting natu-
ralised in Pakistan by obtaining citizenship is thus very low. 
Consequences of implementation gap for international aid 
organisations
Our research has shown that Afghans themselves and the 
different ‘stakeholders’ involved in protecting and supporting 
Afghans have to deal with the consequences of the described 
implementation gap. One expert explained how it was an 
unwritten policy of UNHCR not to discriminate against 
undocumented Afghans even if UNHCR refugee and partner 
support is targeted towards PoR card holders. According to this 
expert, the difference is in the framing of Afghans’ presence 
by the implementing organisation: “In Pakistan, you don’t say 
you benefit undocumented Afghans” (EI-BICC-KM-012-Pak). 
Likewise, UNHCR has to negotiate its space in a difficult envi-
ronment. While the GoP considers return as the only desirable 
durable solution, UNHCR does not necessarily consider it the 
best solution (EI-BICC-KM-011-Pak) but is dependent on a 
working relationship with GoP institutions such as the Ministry 
of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) and the (Chief) 
Commissionerates for Afghan Refugees (C/CARs). Having 
been on a tightrope walk for much of its presence in Pakistan, 
UNHCR has fared better than other international organisations 
8 cf. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1556636573_246.pdf 
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According to our TRAFIG survey, legal aid was the most 
important form of support among Afghans—particularly those 
with only a temporary resident status—who had received 
support from NGOs.10  As one respondent reported, he relies 
on good relations with local NGOs, “because one day I was 
illegally detained by the police. I called SHARP office for help 
and they sent a legal advisor who got me out of detention” (SSI-
SHARP-ZA-126-Pak). Some legal aid NGOs not only support 
registered Afghans but are also engaged in legal rights training 
and awareness-raising with different law enforcement agencies, 
legal institutions, legal staff (e.g., judges and magistrates) and 
police officers at different levels of authority (EI-SHARP-NS-
201-Pak). Through these activities, they develop close relations 
with the authorities and can easily access them should they 
need to assist registered Afghans in legal matters.
In contrast, the NGO Human Rights Alliance (HRA) provides 
legal aid to undocumented Afghans, however, with a geograph-
ical focus on Sindh and Karachi (EI-BICC-KM-09-Pak). As the 
manager explained, 
Undocumented refugees are often kept in prison for 
months and years; entire families are detained. When we 
get informed, HRA negotiates with the different parties 
to get the individuals or entire families released. We pay 
money so that these families can be brought to the border 
and go to Afghanistan. By helping them to get out of the 
major prisons of the districts in Sindh, we prevent mental 
health issues, security and criminal problems that pris-
oners usually have to deal with. Although the condition  
of the authorities is to deport these Afghans, the reality is 



















10 Thirty-two (87 per cent) out of 37 respondents stated that they received 
support by NGOs.
related uncertainties are relevant for registered and undocu-
mented Afghans alike, because in the many instances when 
PoR cards and ACCs are not being extended on time or—as 
is currently the case—extension is delayed indefinitely, this 
has implications for their legal protection in practice and their 
livelihood-making, which we will illustrate in sub-section 3.2. 
We also focus on how Afghans deal with the resulting increased 
vulnerability to discrimination by authorities in general and 
police harassment in particular, the impact on their access to 
healthcare, basic education, and housing, property registration, 
as well as banking issues (cf. also sub-section 3.5). It is impor-
tant to note (and will be explored further in sub-section 3.4) that 
issues besides discrimination result from Afghans’ dependence 
on Pakistani citizens to ‘get their things done’.   
The main strategy employed by Afghans is to seek legal aid 
from NGOs. In the everyday encounters with the police, not 
being able to present a card at all (undocumented Afghans) 
or present a card that is not valid (all registered Afghans) or 
without an extension letter (e.g., all registered Afghans since  
30 June 2020) often results in extortion, detention and/ or 
abuse. If an Afghan is caught without proof of registration (and 
the police officers do not know about or do not acknowledge the 
pending extension need by Cabinet) and the caught Afghan/s 
is not willing or able to bribe himself out of the situation, legal 
aid is an option – provided that the person is aware of it and 
knows, for example, the help line number. Several NGOs such 
as EHSAR Foundation, UNDP, Strengthening Participatory  
Organization (SPO), Paidar Development Organization (PDO) 
and SHARP provide legal assistance in all five Pakistani prov-
inces. Yet, they most exclusively help registered Afghans. 
Figure	3:	Scope	of	implications	of	legal	limbo	showing	fields	where	navigation	becomes	necessary
Note:  Access (to higher education and health services) is understood here as 
the ability to benefit from respective services (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). 
This access is not homogeneous and equal but varies and is manifest in 
different degrees or graduations of this ability to benefit from services 
beyond mere proclaimed rights. In this sense access to higher educati-
on can be eased, enlarged, e.g., by quality enhancement, or decreased 
without depriving Afghans of it entirely (blocked access).   
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Repatriation as the preferred durable solution is no 
solution
The fact that security concerns dominantly frame Pakistan’s 
policies towards Afghans is a major factor in why policies have 
been inadequate to meet needs. The GoP's obsession with de-
claring voluntary repatriation as the ‘preferred’ durable solution 
while refusing to discuss or consider other possible solutions, 
such as local integration, is a case in point (EI-BICC-KM-
005-Pak). Subsequently, there is currently no durable solution 
in sight that could help move Afghans out of protractedness. 
The security lens of the GoP is a real hindrance for effective 
refugee policymaking and the search for a solution and ending 
of Afghans’ protracted displacement situation. Similarly, the 
fact that the bureaucrats in charge do not understand the polit-
ical implications of refugee issues has an adverse influence on 
the status quo. This gets amplified by staff rotation, ignorance 
and political affiliation of the provincial Commissionerates for 
Afghan Refugees (CAR) representatives. UNHCR does not 
believe a large-scale refugee status determination (RSD) to be 
feasible under these circumstances.
To discuss voluntary return as a durable solution has not 
worked so far. Large-scale re-migration to Pakistan and adverse 
conditions in Afghanistan for returnees to (re)integrate prove 
that voluntary return is no solution. According to one academic 
expert, the different ideas, concepts and policies that have 
evolved in the past for managing Afghans in Pakistan show the 
concern of the international community for refugees, but 
none of these ideas have changed anything for refugees 
on the ground, i.e., the average Afghan in Pakistan. Nor 
do they guide the protection and assistance Afghans need 
in emergency situations. From the Afghans’ point of view, 
they feel their issues and needs are neglected and are not 
high on the political agenda. It is still unresolved how 
practical solutions can be brought about that Afghans can 
profit from. The GoP, UNHCR and the donor community 
are groping in the dark for a workable solution even if 
this is in stark contrast with their articulated intention to 
end the cycle of displacement. In Pakistan, the doors are 
closed, few Afghans have access to resettlement. Repatri-
ation is the favoured option in policy circles, with some 
de facto forced cases of return having even taken place—
although nobody in Pakistan would ever admit they were 
forced. The average Afghan feels they are denied solu-
tions. All stakeholders are increasingly exhausted: The 
refugees, the hosts and the international community. The 
issue is very complex (EI-BICC-KM-016-Pak). 
So, if they don’t find any work or place to live in Afghan-
istan, they return to Pakistan. This has been a common 
mechanism. […] When a family member of a caught 
Afghan who is unregistered has a PoR card or ACC; this 
can help the case and the life of an undocumented person 
in general (EI-BICC-KM-09-Pak).
The quote points out that—in times where cards’ validity is 
extended by notification letter—the holding of cards of at least 
some family members (whereas several might not have obtained 
either PoR card or ACC) can help a legal case if one of them is 
caught by the police.11     
The other interface with authorities where legal aid plays a 
crucial role is the negotiation of access to medium and higher 
education institutions for Afghan students. As a legal expert ex-
plained: “there are regularly admission issues for Afghans, e.g., 
when they were not able to appear in front of Boards for grade 
9 and 10, and for school admission in general. Very often, local 
administrators lack clarity about the status of Afghans, e.g., 
school principals or the police. Human rights specialists from 
CAR then come in to help” (EI-BICC-KM-002-Pak). 
Afghans who had been able to obtain a Pakistani National 
Identity Card (CNIC) in the past sometimes still benefit from it 
today, even if they have been found to have acquired it illegally. 
The following report of a respondent gives account of this: 
I obtained a CNIC in 2004 with the help of a local 
working in NADRA. I got the CNIC in return for two lakh 
[200,000] Rupees and could travel freely to Quetta and 
Karachi and Karachi to Quetta. I bought a house in 2015 
in Quetta which was registered in my own name. Unfortu-
nately, my CNIC expired in 2016. When I went for renewal 
to the NADRA office, they demanded my family records 
registered with NADRA. Since then, I have been trying 
to renew my CNIC but unsuccessfully. A year ago, I went 
to Afghanistan to get my tazkeera [Afghan basic identity 
document] and Afghan passport. I keep the expired CNIC 
in my pocket. If I face any problem, I show this CNIC and 
get rid of the problems, especially if the police stop me on 
my way to Quetta. The policemen usually do not check the 
CNIC in detail; they look at its cover and let me go 
(SSI-SHARP-ZA-125-Pak).
11 Legal assistance is also sometimes viable in cases where conflicts over con-
tracts arise with members of the host society. However, as sub-section 3.4 will 
show, the most common way of solving such conflicts is via the involvement of 
a person of authority who is generally known to both conflict parties. This also 
corresponds to our observation that, given the fear from the police, Afghans 
tend to solve conflicts among themselves and not involve authorities.  
Cf. sub-sections 3.2 to 3.4.
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What should be done instead? Which ideas were brought forth 
in the interviews that point to a way ahead? Here, a govern-
ment employee shows an insightful perspective. Talking about 
repatriation, he said: 
There are two types of Afghans, and only one requires 
help or a solution, i.e. the poor. We can assume that 
they will not return to Afghanistan for reasons of liveli-
hood-making—because in Afghanistan, it is not possible 
to the extent as in Pakistan—and climatic conditions. In 
Pakistan, nobody is interested in solving the problem and 
amending the situation of Afghans because people get  
salaries on behalf of their administration of poor people. 
The latest invention and policy turn is now with the pass-
port and visa regime that is to be implemented without 
giving people financial resources. Policymakers get 
together in five-star hotels to take such decisions (EI-
BICC-KM-004-Pak). 
Further, the interviewee admits: “I am part of this but not on the 
top level; only on the ground level”, suggesting that he cannot 
change things and is not responsible for top-level vested inter-
ests. He concludes that only a significant change in incentives 
for these salary recipients—including UNHCR, GoP and  
(I)NGOs—bears the potential to change the situation of  
Afghans in Pakistan, bringing a ‘durable solution’. He wonders 
where the ‘actual problem’ with the presence of Afghans lies, 
given that the plight of ordinary Afghans and Pakistanis is not 
much different in terms of daily life and survival. He further 
points to Afghans’ assumed privileged status as refugees  
outside Pakistan that puts them above ordinary Pakistanis and 
is thus a cause for possible grievances of Pakistanis towards  
Afghans. He concludes: “Afghans’ presence seems to be a 
money- making machine for entire strata of GoP staff and 
NGO-employees and representatives. The disinterest in 
solutions hampers the recognition that Afghans will not return 
and the facilitation of their local integration” (EI-BICC-KM-
004-Pak). 
A second, rather structural challenge is the situation in Af-
ghanistan itself and how it conditions the chance of voluntary 
repatriation as a durable solution. Put differently, it requires 
“that the GoP and the donor community make significant 
development efforts in Afghanistan to create the conditions for 
return and reintegration” (EI-BICC-KM-011-Pak). The Solution 
Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR) has taken account of 
this by shifting its focus from humanitarian to development 
aid activities for Afghans and host communities, emphasising 
skills-building, education and training for Afghans. This is com-
plemented by UNHCR sectoral measures towards a solution, 
e.g., in education, access to health and refugee-affected hosting 
areas (RAHA) programming to increase social cohesion. 
As one UNHCR representative stated: “If you cannot take a 
big leap towards a solution, take little steps” (EI-BICC-KM-
011-Pak). 
Concluding remarks
Immediate needs at the policy level include the re-registration 
of PoR cards, the extension of stay arrangements for Afghans 
(both PoR card and ACC holders) and further registration of un-
documented Afghans with longer-term protection entitlements 
and long-term stay arrangements. While in practice hardly any 
of the one to 1.5 million undocumented Afghans in Pakistan 
are deported, and mass arrests do not take place, Afghans and 
experts have been demanding certainty for up to 2025, which 
will allow Afghans to decide for themselves whether, when and 
where they will move to Afghanistan (EI-BICC-KM-005-Pak). 
Such practical measures require political will and support for 
these decisions in Pakistani society, including political parties. 
A re-branding of Afghans’ image in Pakistan would be helpful 
in this regard. However, any implementation of it such as 
teaching tolerance via school curricula and textbooks will not 
be achieved in the short term. Activities and policies need to 
acknowledge that second- and third-generation Afghans will 
not return to Afghanistan as is envisaged by current policy. 
The GoA and GoP alike need to come to terms with this reality 
and think of ways to make the presence of Afghans in Pakistan 
work for both sides.  
Key findings
•	 No international or national legislation is governing 
protection and aid provision for displaced Afghans in 
Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan, donors, inter-
national and local implementers, as well as the Afghans 
themselves operate in a legal limbo. 
•	 Existing frameworks for protection and aid are policy- 
and donor-driven, as is the GoP's insistence on repa-
triation as the only acceptable solution for Afghans in 
Pakistan. 
•	 Policies and the solution strategy fall short of implemen-
tation, while the strict denial of an implementation gap 
is indicative of refugee rentierism. The influx of refu-
gees from the 1980s onwards has resulted in a thriving 
humanitarian (aid) sector and created government 
departments with vested interests.
•	 There is no durable solution in sight to end the pro-
tracted displacement of Afghans.
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low-income earners with little or no education and low skill 
levels who engage in scrap collection, livestock tenure, daily 
labouring at the vegetable market and construction.     
The interviews showed how the described spatial stratification 
patterns in one neighbourhood agglomeration of three distinct 
settlements reflect (and for the purpose of this section intro-
duce) the scope of low-income, lower-middle class and middle 
class Afghans’ experiences of livelihood-making, socio-economic 
and everyday-protection limbo. Each neighbourhood can be 
typified with one sample resident or household in a simplified 
representation: 
•	 The Uzbek doctor from an urban background in northern 
Afghanistan who runs a doctor’s office. He rents an 
apartment at Chapal Garden, and his sons and daughter 
have received quality education up to university level (in 
Urdu and English) although their legal status does not 
entitle them to take up public sector jobs. He entertains 
good relations with his neighbours, both Pakistani citi-
zens and Afghans, and is in close contact with relatives 
in Afghanistan and abroad. The nearby police station is 
no nuisance for his family (SSI-SHARP-ARK-302-Pak). 
•	 The Tajik or Pashtun shopkeeper who lives and works at 
Al Asif-Square. He sends three of his five sons to school 
and spends his time mostly with members of his own 
community in the immediate neighbourhood. He is in 
regular phone contact with his relatives in Afghanistan 
and Quetta as well as other cities in Pakistan. He hides 
his income and potential wealth from his neighbours as 
a strategy to avoid being robbed or kidnapped (SSI-
SHARP-ZA-109-Pak). 
•	 The 35-year-old Uzbek day labourer who lives in 
Jhangabad and strives to benefit from additional income 
that he makes with livestock trade and sale before Eid 
ul-Adha (Islamic sacrifice festival) to save money for 
medical emergencies. His children attend the religious 
teachings in the nearby madrassa (religious school ) 
that is run by a trusted mullah. The public school is too 
far, and his children do not speak Urdu well. His father 
used to travel to rural Kunduz in Afghanistan regularly 
once or twice a year to look after the family’s land and 
harvest and to see his relatives. He feels secure because 
the neighbourhood is ethnically homogeneous, people 
know each other and self-organise nightly guards on a 
rotational basis (SSI-SHARP-NS-202-Pak). 
In Lahore, we find similar conditions to the ones just intro-
duced for Karachi. The Pul Saggian (literally: Saggian Bridge) 
field site can be likened to that of Jhangabad (lower class) in 
Karachi. Like Jhangabad, it is a peri-urban squatter site located 
near the River Ravi. An estimated 350 to 450 families or 2,000 
to 2,300 individuals live there (SHARP, 2020, p. 1), many of 
them ethnic Baluch (Dari- and Pashto-speakers) from Afghan-
istan’s Kunduz and Baghlan provinces. They found their occu-
3.2	Living	in	limbo:	Livelihoods,	(in)security	
and	precarity	in	local	settings	
This section looks into Theme 2 of TRAFIG: ‘Living in limbo: 
Livelihoods, (in)security and precarity in local settings’. This 
section aims to address the main question: ‘Why and how do 
displaced people live in situations of ‘limbo‘ and how do they 
sustain their livelihoods?.
Limbo and social immobility among lower class 
Afghans
This section zooms in on two comparative cases of settlements 
of Afghans located in Lahore and Karachi to demonstrate how 
socio-economic stratification and class affect access options of 
Afghans with different legal statuses. 
The northern part of the megacity Karachi is constantly 
expanding. A SHARP-internal document of 2019 assessed 
the number of Afghans living in northern Karachi to be up to 
87,000 people, of whom an estimated 65,000 were registered 
as PoR card holders before 2018. Afghan settlements that came 
into being as early as the late 1970s in what then was an entirely 
rural area (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 36), are today part of the 
peri-urban core even though the three neighbourhoods where 
the team conducted interviews—Chapal Garden, Al Asif-
Square and Jhangabad—feature distinct characteristics and 
origin trajectories. Chapal Garden on the eastern side of the 
M-9 Highway is a rather new, urban-looking planned area with 
apartment blocks from the 1990s/ 2000s that offer all amenities 
to its Pakistani and Afghan residents. Afghans who settled 
here are educated, (highly) skilled and have a good income 
that allows them to pay the rent and enjoy the relative calm and 
security in the neighbourhood.
Al Asif-Square is located opposite the M-9 Highway, consists  
of apartment blocks that house a mix of residents—from 
more affluent, middle class traders and skilled workers to 
lower-middle and lower class labourers—and a large market 
specialised in Afghan goods and foodstuffs. Al Asif-Square 
neighbourhood came into being in the 1980s; its number of 
residents was estimated at 20,000 (CSSR, 2005, p. 12) in 2005, 
of whom between 60 and 75 per cent were Afghans of different 
ethnic backgrounds (except Hazara), and the remaining 40 to  
25 per cent were Pakistani Pashtuns.
Jhangabad (literally: War town) is the name of the area west 
of the M-9 Highway a little north of Al Asif-Square, featuring 
unplanned makeshift housing near Sector 2-C. It evolved in the 
1990s as a result of a mass influx of Afghan refugees from the 
civil war that started in 1992. Jhangabad is home to different 
ethnic communities of Afghans that have settled compactly 
on government land. As such, the area is not developed and in 
transition from a basic squatter camp to an irregular housing 
area (katchi abadi) without tenure security. The residents are 
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socio-economic and everyday protection limbo. We will 
analyse the needs and challenges in relation to the strategies 
Afghans apply to tackle these challenges and meet different 
needs. In the first sub-section, we focus on strategies towards 
accessing labour markets, shelter, education, and health facili-
ties, while in the second section, we focus on strategies to avoid 
physical insecurity.
Living in socio-economic limbo 
We found that socio-economic limbo and social immobility 
were predominant among lower class Afghans in low-income 
neighbourhoods. The well-off (middle class) Afghans in Pakistan 
do not live in precarity with all its subsequent effects and prob-
lems, such as finding decent and secure shelters or accessing 
health and education facilities, because they can afford all of it.
Access to employment
Not even half of the respondents (47 per cent of 299 persons) 
had work at the time of our TRAFIG survey (November 2020–
February 2021). We noted clear differences between study sites 
and groups. More Afghans who lived in the periphery of large 
cities had work (75 per cent) compared to those in cities (46 
per cent) and rural areas (13 per cent). Employment levels of 
refugees living in camps were much lower than average (30 per 
cent). Most notably, labour force participation among men was 
much higher (72 per cent) than among women (20 per cent), 
higher among younger (65 per cent of those between 20-29) 
than older Afghans (44 per cent of the age group 50-59), and 
higher among better educated (71 per cent of those with a sec-
ondary school degree or higher) than among those who never 
went to school (38 per cent). Legal status also mattered when 
it came to access to employment: All three respondents with 
Pakistani citizenship—an admittedly very small share in our 
sample—had work.  In comparison, 48 per cent of those with 
a temporary residency and 32 per cent of unregistered Afghan 
migrants were (self-) employed. 
The not and low-skilled respondents of our semi-structured 
interviews were shopkeepers, vendors, daily labourers, worked 
in construction and transport businesses (without drivers’ 
licenses), as tailors, scrap collectors and traders, rearing live-
stock and trading, as security guards, washermen, waiters, run-
ning mobile food stalls, had a tandoor (bakery), a mobile repair 
shop or worked in mines, for instance in the vicinity of camps 
in southern Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. In Karachi, Pakistan’s eco-
nomic centre and trade hub, several Afghans we spoke to found 
work in the many factories producing biscuits, matches, gar-
ments and soap, or in brick kilns. Female respondents reported 
earning and contributing to the household income with handi-
crafts, i.e., through embroidering, tailoring and sewing. Several 
women had benefited from training courses and the provision 
of sewing machines from NGOs. They work at home and sell 
pational niche in the scrap business to which usually all family 
members—including children and women—contribute and 
have established large makeshift depots of different kinds of 
scrap at their site. While the men collect scrap at night, women 
and children sort it during the day, and the men sell the different 
materials to factories according to orders and requirements of 
wholesalers. The community lives in destitute conditions, shel-
tered in tents (after a fire destroyed better shelters years ago), 
remote from services like doctors and schools, on rented land. 
The residents, especially the women, feel insecure because 
there have been cases when children were kidnapped, and one 
father who had followed a kidnapper at night was shot. The case 
was not followed up properly by the nearby police station; a 
feeling of powerlessness is tangible among the residents of Pul 
Saggian.
In contrast, Afghan businessmen who belong to the up-
per-middle class have their carpet workshops and storage rooms 
in one of the oldest and most densely populated residential 
neighbourhoods of Lahore, Garhi Shahu. They themselves and 
their business partners reside in upper class areas like Gulberg 
or even of the Defence Housing Authority (DHA) of Lahore, 
their highly skilled employees in Garhi Shahu and surrounding 
parts of the inner city. Their children go to high-quality private 
schools, attend colleges and universities. They have wide 
family relations to and family members in Turkey and Canada, 
among other countries. Their business activities provide jobs 
for Afghans in Lahore and in Afghanistan (in particular, female 
carpet weavers in northern districts of Afghanistan) as well as 
Pakistani citizens. Few of their business colleagues have opted 
to adopt the new visa regime for businessmen and stay and do 
their business in Pakistan with an Afghan passport and business 
visa, paying taxes to the Pakistani system. They regularly go 
back and forth to Afghanistan for business purposes. Their car-
pets are displayed in exhibitions and fairs across the world, e.g., 
in Germany, the United States and Japan. However, if they are 
registered refugees, they do not own shops in their own name 
and completely depend for wholesale, retail and international 
business on Pakistani business associates.  
Both communities of Afghans in Lahore have nothing to do 
with each other, nor do the residents of the three neighbour-
hoods in Karachi, despite their spatial proximity. The examples 
point out how settlement is segregated according to ethno-reli-
gious, tribal and class properties. Accordingly, Afghans’ social 
networks are locally/ spatially limited. Our research did not 
detect any inclusive social representation mechanisms beyond 
the groups and individual communities or solidarity across 
classes among Afghans. 
Based on the entire range of qualitative data and thus going 
beyond the selected/ typified examples above, the next two 
sub-sections systematically present how Afghans experience 
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In several cases, we detected a continuity in the type of 
livelihood-making over generations and from before to after/ 
in displacement. For example, a shopkeeper who hailed from 
Imam Sahib in Kunduz province had sold his shop before 
migrating to Pakistan. After he had settled in in Chapal Garden, 
he opened a merchant shop in the neighbourhood (SSI-SHARP-
ZA-109-Pak). Other Afghans who engaged in livestock rearing 
and trade before the festival of Eid ul-Adha reported that their 
parents or ancestors had been nomads or traded livestock, so 
they felt it natural and fitting for themselves to engage in the 
same trade (SSI-SHARP-NS-202-Pak). Besides the already 
discussed lack of eligibility for public sector employment that 
affects all Afghans in Pakistan due to their legal status, barriers 
to employment among lower class Afghans are high due to their 
lack of skills and education, including low literacy rates. An-
other barrier to employment is the distrust from private sector 
employers of the host community as well as increasingly hostile 
host community behaviour. 
Overall, the households of two-thirds of our survey respondents 
relied primarily on income generated by their own—largely in-
formal—businesses and self-employment, whereas 17 per cent 
primarily depended on salary from employment or pay from 
or other kinds of (also temporary) work. Agricultural labour as 
well as aid and welfare benefits such as cash transfers hardly 
played a role as livelihood sources (see Figure 4).
Access to shelter
Only three per cent of Afghan survey respondents own the 
place in which they live, while ten per cent live in a room or 
shelter that is provided for free. The vast majority of respond-
ents (78 per cent) live in a rented apartment or house. Not 
finding even a temporary job and longer-term unemployment is 
thus catastrophic for low-income Afghans because they usually 
have no savings and live from hand to mouth. The average rent 
for apartments and houses paid by lower- and lower-middle  
to women (Afghan and Pakistanis) in the neighbourhood. Child 
labour is common; children help in their fathers’ businesses like 
scrap collection and sorting, in shops, engage in factory work 
and work as shoeshiners in neighbourhoods. One respondent 
explained how he took his little daughter along when searching 
for waste and scrap materials calculating that being accompa-
nied by her, he would not be stopped and checked by the police. 
While he is looking for scrap, his daughter is selling boiled eggs 
(SSI-SHARP-AI-411-Pak).
In contrast, respondents with elementary and or intermediate 
education and skills reported to be teachers at religious schools 
(madrassas), teachers at community or private elementary 
schools, employed by local NGOs as disseminators or trainers 
for skill-development projects (e.g., mobile phone repairs), run 
mobile phone and repair shops, work as managers in fisheries, 
engaged in the carpet manufacturing business as well as prop-
erty and car dealers inside camps. Few generated good business 
income from transnational trading, such as trading in carpets, 
dried fruits and fabrics. The prevalent form of employment is 
self-employment or daily labouring. A small proportion of Af-
ghans in Pakistan run large-scale private sector businesses and 
employ Pakistanis and Afghans alike. Similarly, even Afghans 
engaging in the scrap business do so with a wide spectrum of 
activities and potentials. While some are just making ends meet 
as collectors and sorters of scrap, the interviewers heard from 
several respondents that they had established successful scrap 
businesses with up to ten employees, mostly other Afghans but 
also Pakistanis (SSI-SHARP-ZA-121-Pak, SSI-SHARP-ZA-
123-Pak). In one case, a household head strategically decided to 
move from Lahore to Karachi because of better prospects there 
in the scrap business; he has successfully established himself 
in Karachi and can provide for his family (SSI-SHARP-ZA-
120-Pak). Educated young Afghans working at the top end of 
the income ladder also work in government positions and (I)
NGOs, trade and private sector jobs in Kabul while their fami-
lies live in Islamabad.
Figure	4:	Afghans’	primary	sources	of	living	
Source:  TRAFIG survey (n=299)
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Those who legally rent apartments and houses turn towards 
peri-urban areas or low-income neighbourhoods; however, 
utility bills are proving to be an increasing burden and amount 
to at least 10,000 PKR, i.e. 57 EUR a month (as of 1 January 
2020).14  Alluding to a coping strategy, a female resident of 
Multan Changi, a peri-urban location in Lahore, stated, for ex-
ample: “We rented a house for 20,000 Rupees and can share the 
rent with my brother-in-law who lives with us. Therefore, we 
can manage, but the utility bill is becoming a nightmare for us” 
(SSI-SHARP-AI-418-Pak). Another respondent reported how 
they cope by limiting their food intake and eating less quality 
food to save money and cover the running costs of housing 
(SSI-SHARP-AI-418-Pak).
Role of external sources of income
Income from labour migration, remittances or assets in 
Afghanistan play only a negligible role as a regular source of 
living for Afghans living in Pakistan. This observation from 
semi-structured interviews can be confirmed based on our 
survey findings (see Figure 4). However, when asked about the 
kind of support they got from ‘important persons’ who live 
elsewhere, 15 per cent of survey respondents replied that they 
had (occasionally) received financial support. Few Afghans 
thus rely on external resources, which we see as an indication 
of translocal connectivity, and if so, only in cases of emergency. 
In the few examples where respondents received remittances 
from Iran, Canada, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, or in the one case 
where a person sold his land and property in Afghanistan 
(SSI-SHARP-ZA-101-Pak), they used these funds for medical 
treatment of relatives (in one case of an accident, in one case for 
fertility treatment of someone’s wife) or the reconstruction of 
their home after a fire had destroyed shelters. 
For labour migration, Iran was mentioned as the only option. 
However, only very few interviewees (SSI-SHARP-ZA-
107-Pak, SSI-SHARP-ZA-120-Pak) had ever used this option. 
Access to healthcare
Overall, Afghans in Pakistan have adequate access to health-
care. 91 per cent of our TRAFIG survey respondents stated that 
they could access a hospital or other health services the last 
time they needed it. However, the fact that Afghans accumu-
late savings for medical emergencies shows that there are still 
multiple hurdles that Afghans face in reality when it comes to 
receiving adequate health care. The public healthcare system 
is overburdened and underfinanced, while the private health 
sector is well developed and thriving. Thus, it is no surprise 
14 cf. previous footnote. For media reporting on clashes over power bills among 
refugees, see Hayat (2020).
class respondents amounts to 12,500 PKR, approximately  
70 EUR a month (as of 1 January 2020).12  At the lower end, it is 
about 25 EUR. In Pul Saggian in Lahore and in the interviewed 
community in Jhangabad in Karachi, for example, people pay 
their rent collectively to persons claiming to be the owners 
(often some type of land mafia). While living in such congested 
homogeneous settlements with co-ethnics provides security 
and resembles the socio-economic status of a resident, it can 
also represent a ‘forced choice’ if a person is not registered. 
A Punjab government rule punishes landlords who rent out to 
unregistered Afghans unless the Afghans provide an affidavit 
to the police, which can only be approved with proof of regis-
tration as PoR card- or ACC-holder.13  As one female resident of 
Pul Saggian describes:
For some time, we lived in a room adjacent to a shop 
on the other side of the road near this locality. But one 
day, the owner asked us to leave saying the government 
announced to impose a fine of 50,000 Rupees for anybody 
who will provide residence to a refugee. So, we came to 
Pul Saggian camp (SSI-SHARP-AI-402-Pak).
 Squatting on government land or in irregular housing colonies 
(katchi abadis) represents one strategy to access shelter, 
however, for low-income Afghans, this is only a choice if they 
opt for it collectively to ensure the greatest extent of physical 
security they can hope for, e.g., in camps or camp-like settle-
ments. Evidence shows that individual families, especially 
from a socio-economically vulnerable background, would not 
settle on their own in an alien neighbourhood among people 
of similar socio-economic status. Complicating the situation, 
however, is the fact that due to rising land prices, government 
land and land rented by the government to shelter refugees in 
the past has become highly contested. According to one expert, 
there are many cases where owners of previously leased out 
land to the government—for which the government, by the way, 
had stopped paying the lease years ago—are now suing the gov-
ernment to gain back their land (EI-BICC-KM-016-Pak). This 
means a shrinking space for those currently settling on the land 
because—even if they have been paying “rent” to the owners 
already for years voluntarily and higher prices than requested 
from Pakistanis (EI-BICC-KM-008-Pak)—the risk of shifts in 
ownership, sale of the land, etc. is high and means increasing 
uncertainty for the future. 
12 Average calculated from 16 SSI-respondents mentioning the amount of 
monthly rent and (partly) utility bills they pay. Exchange rate applied of  
1 January 2020.
13 cf. 3.1, the government of Punjab issued the Punjab Information of Temporary 
Residents Act in 2015 that requires landlords to register tenants with the local 
police station.
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elementary levels: Several respondents mentioned the distance 
of schools and security issues for girls in rural and peri-urban 
areas. Such immobility issues risk creating an education gap 
for girls—a problem which at least one organisation has started 
to respond to by establishing informal community schools (EI-
BICC-KM-009-Pak). School enrollment depends on registra-
tion and extension letters, and even with registration, access is 
sometimes difficult as school principals are often not familiar 
with the situation of refugees. In such cases, legal aid or advice 
from NGOs is crucial. A fundamental choice for low-income 
families is between being able to afford to send their children 
to school versus obliging them to contribute to the household 
income to make ends meet. As a result, families only send some 
of their children to school while others help them in their daily 
businesses and at home. Issues also arise after elementary level 
with children, having studied the Afghan curriculum in an 
Afghan community school, making the obligatory shift to the 
Pakistani curriculum from grade 6 onwards. Efforts underway 
since 2017 to ensure the complementarity of both curricula have 
so far not been very successful, and the anticipated shift has 
been one reason for parents to take their children out of school 
after grade 5. This is partly motivated and amplified by future 
uncertainties and limited job perspectives in formal employ-
ment, i.e., the government sector. The fact that Afghans are not 
eligible to take up employment in the public sector discourages 
parents from giving their children a decent further education 
(SSI-SHARP-NS-202-Pak). For example, a lawyer with Afghan 
background cannot practice in Pakistan because he would need 
the certificate of the Pakistan Bar Association, which is never 
issued to an Afghan (EI-BICC-KM-012-Pak). 
While many interviewees expressed aspirations to have their 
children or grandchildren educated to achieve social mobility, 
the experiences showed that this is not always accessible/ 
achievable under precarious circumstances. Schools are not 
open access, of low quality, and access barriers exist even with 
proof of registration. The same is true for higher education. 
While registered Afghans, in theory, have the same access 
options for enrolment as Pakistani peers, the enrolment proce-
dure disadvantages and discriminates them due to lengthy and 
bureaucratic processes. This is also true for students who have 
successfully finished their bachelor’s degree and seek to enrol 
in a master’s programme. One expert told us about the case of 
a student with an Afghan refugee background who at the time 
of the interview had been denied admission for a master’s by 
his university in Baluchistan, even though he had graduated 
with distinction (‘gold medal’) from the same institution in his 
bachelor course. The case was referred to the Commissionerate 
for Afghan Refugees (CAR) and SAFRON, but its resolution 
seemed highly uncertain (EI-BICC-KM-010-Pak). The regular 
procedure for Afghan-origin students’ admission is that, before 
enrolment, the potential applicant must go through a verifica-
tion procedure administered by CAR that requires verification 
from the Afghan embassy in Islamabad to issue a non-objection 
that Afghans prefer private hospitals and doctors, yet those 
who cannot afford private facilities depend on public health 
facilities. Given that the situation for Pakistani citizens is the 
same, the legal status of Afghans makes hardly any difference 
in the ability to access health services (EI-BICC-KM-010-Pak). 
Rather, it is the financial situation of an ill person that decides 
whether they will get proper treatment. However, even though 
four out of five unregistered Afghan migrants mentioned in 
our survey that they were treated at a hospital the last time they 
needed to, it is common practice to borrow PoR cards or ACCs 
to enter public health facilities (SSI-SHARP-AI-406-Pak, SSI-
SHARP-AI-411-Pak). 
According to one expert, government health facilities suffer 
from a lack of public finance and resources. The refugee 
population has never been budgeted into plans (EI-BICC-KM-
001-Pak) even though the government did link free access to 
health services to Afghans’ registration status. Another expert 
stated that Pakistan’s health system is already overburdened 
by its citizens’ health needs alone (EI-BICC-KM-012-Pak). 
The under-financing of the public health sector partially 
explains the problems Afghans experience in public health 
institutions (as do Pakistanis with no means to afford private 
doctors): There are long waiting times, doctors are absent, and 
many respondents deemed their behaviour and examination 
practice unprofessional. Doctors do not prescribe or hand 
out proper medication—it is issued subject to availability, or 
patients are requested to purchase medicine themselves. As 
a result, Afghans not only turn to private clinics or fee-based 
private doctors when their medical condition is serious (SSI-
SHARP-ZA-122) but also when they do not have time and 
only minor ailments. The research detected kidney diseases, 
especially chronic kidney problems and needs for dialysis as 
one of the most frequently mentioned illnesses demanding 
due care. In one location, two patients needing dialysis receive 
financial support from members of the Afghan community at 
the site, i.e., those who “are economically stable” were reported 
to finance the treatment three times a week (SSI-SHARP-NS-
202-Pak).
Access to education 
Of the survey interviewees, 81 per cent stated that one or more 
members of their household are currently enrolled in school or 
other educational activities. Even among unregistered Afghans, 
this share lies at 58 per cent. And yet, access to education 
services is limited by similar structural factors as just described 
for access to healthcare. The public education system is of low 
quality with neither enough schools nor teachers. One expert 
stated that given in Pakistan (a country of 180 million people 
as per the census of 1998) only about 400,000 children of all 
backgrounds are enrolled in good schools (meaning private 
schools), the remaining children either go to public or religious 
schools (madrassas) (EI-BICC-KM-001-Pak). While these 
schools are not charging fees, several challenges remain for 
lower class Afghan parents to enrol their children even in 
TRAFIG working paper no.7  •  08/2021  •  21TRAFIG working paper no.7  •  08/2021  •  20
Many respondents reported that they would pay money to the 
police officer just to get out of the situation (e.g., SSI-SHARP-
AI-405-Pak). Such payments at check posts amounted to be-
tween 200 and 6,000 PKR. When detained for putative expired 
documents, reported bribes demanded for release were up to 
20,000 PKR (see below). If somebody rejected paying money 
to the police, he would be dependent on access to legal aid by 
specialised NGOs as the following example demonstrates: 
I visit my two sisters in Peshawar twice a year and once, 
upon travelling to Peshawar by bus, I was taken out from 
the bus by the police, and they said my PoR card had 
expired. Even though I showed them the extension notifi-
cation, they refused to acknowledge it and detained me. 
Once at the police station, they demanded 20,000 PKR for 
my release. When I refused to pay the money, they kept me 
in custody for five days even though I had done nothing 
wrong and my documents were in order. On the sixth day, 
a team of a local prisoners’ aid NGO came. They took 
on my case, talked to the police inspector, and when they 
made clear that they would sue the police officers in court 
if I was not released immediately, they let me go, and I 
continued on my journey (SSI-SHARP-ZA-123-Pak). 
Especially vulnerable lower class communities of Afghans face 
a certain arbitrariness in police encounters and raids at their 
residences, as two female interviewees of Pul Saggian reported: 
“Whenever something bad happens anywhere, the police comes 
to our house and takes one of the men with them and then 
releases him after one night at the police station” (SSI-SHARP-
AI-402-Pak). “They raid and enter our houses without showing 
a search warrant and without warning or informing the women 
of the house” (SSI-SHARP-AI-403-Pak). 
We are thus speaking of a daily sense of insecurity and 
protection limbo. Protection issues for ordinary lower and 
lower-middle class Afghans arise mainly from ‘outside’ of and 
sometimes ‘from within’ their own tribal, kin or settlement 
community. In our semi-structured interviews, some respond-
ents, especially women, perceived the surroundings as threat-
ening because they experienced threats themselves (women 
were being followed by strangers, children kidnapped), and the 
Pakistani security authorities are seen more as a threat than pro-
viding security for Afghans. The example mentioned earlier of 
the case of Pul Saggian (cf. sub-section 3.2), where the murder 
of a family head was not investigated, indicates the absence of a 
rule of law context. Afghans do not experience equality before 
the law in their everyday encounters (see also 3.1 and 3.4). 
certificate (NOC) that has to be submitted with the application. 
Access to studies seems easier via foreigner slots that can be 
applied for with an Afghan passport and study visas. How-
ever, in this case, the fees for international students will apply. 
Interviews with experts revealed two potential access avenues 
for Afghans to enrol in Pakistani universities: For one, DAFI 
Higher Education scholarships—since 1992 with more than 
1,700 students profiting from it so far. For another, a special 
programme at Qaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad intro-
duced by the current government (status 2021) that allows a 
batch of students with Afghan ‘refugee’ background (PoR card 
holders) to study and obtain degrees in International Relations 
(EI-BICC-KM-008-Pak). 
Experiencing everyday protection limbo     
Our research found that low socio-economic and low education/ 
skills status is directly related to a lack of protection from 
everyday discrimination. Fourteen per cent of the survey re-
spondents stated that they had already experienced harassment 
or intimidation at the place where they live—the figures differ 
not significantly according to legal status but are much higher 
in the lower class settlements of Al-Asif Square (37 per cent) 
and Jhangabad (31 per cent) in Karachi as well as Pul Saggian 
in Lahore (31 per cent) than in any other study sites. While 
almost one-quarter of interviewees are afraid of violence in 
their locality—again the highest numbers are in the three afore-
mentioned lower class urban neighbourhoods of Karachi (e.g., 
54 per cent in Al-Asif Square) and Lahore and in the city of 
Mardan—only very few (12 of 299) mentioned actual encoun-
ters with violence. Those who experienced violent encounters 
responded that state actors such as the police had been the 
perpetrators of violence against them. 
Police harassment seems to be ubiquitous, manifest in extor-
tion during overland travel (SSI-SHARP-AI-415-Pak, SSI-
SHARP-ZA-112-Pak), corruption at police checkpoints in the 
city and at traffic junctions, violence and beatings in custody 
or when stopped and taken out of a bus for being searched, 
unannounced search operations in Afghans’ premises and 
shops (SSI-SHARP-ZA-119-Pak), abusive language, and, in 
general, awareness of the omnipresent “possibility that the 
police or security authorities can penetrate your space anytime” 
(EI-BICC-KM-008-Pak). Police would usually request proof of 
Afghans’ legal status and, in many cases, do not know or deny 
the fact that the PoR cards (which formally expired in 2015 but 
have ever since been extended by notification in the form of a 
document) or ACC are valid with an updated notification.15   
 
15 At least this was the case in the past, the last notified extension of PoR cards 
and ACC expired on 30 June 2020 and ever since (until the time of writing, i.e., 
1st March 2021) Afghans are in complete legal limbo. Cf. sub-section 3.1 for 
details and background. 
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they also faced economic hardship (SSI-SHARP-AI-405-Pak). 
This shows the limitations of support within the family. Many 
interviewees mentioned the significance of having sons and 
their contributions to the family income as children (SSI-
SHARP-ZA-120-Pak, SSI-SHARP-NS-203-Pak) and their 
parents’ total reliance on their income as adults. The diversifi-
cation of professions is remarkable. In two cases where the sons 
jointly earn the family income, their jobs range from unskilled 
to skilled: In one family, one son rears livestock, the second 
makes fast food, the third is a teacher in a primary school 
(SSI-SHARP-ZA-106-Pak). In another family, two sons work 
as waiters in restaurants, two others as labourers in a garment 
factory and one as a teacher at a religious school (madrassa) 
(SSI-SHARP-ZA-107-Pak). It goes without saying that diversi-
fication is instrumental for resilience and constitutes a strategy 
to earn respect within the community. 
The Ismaili community is a prime example of intra-community 
cohesion. Afghan Ismailis have benefitted from the support of 
the ethno-religious network of Pakistani Ismailis. They have 
close-knit support structures and their own educational and 
health institutions. This, for example, means that they enjoy 
preferential treatment at the high-quality Agha Khan hospital in 
Karachi. One respondent reported discounts amounting to 50 to 
70 per cent for Ismailis at their educational institutes. As the 
Ismaili community is highly skilled, job placements are facili-
tated easily. One respondent’s father profited from this when he 
got work as a manager in fisheries (SSI-SHARP-ZA-117-Pak). 
The mutual support strategies and networks at the community 
level to counter the detected everyday protection limbo include 
a cohesive ethnic settlement with as much community cohesion 
(similar background, having relationships) as possible, practices 
like hiding wealth and earnings, obeying and respecting local 
leaders/ elders in case of necessary intervention on behalf of 
the family (to help bail somebody out of jail or resolve a conflict 
with elders of the other conflict party), to mobilise institutional 
aid, etc. In many cases, elders access legal aid from NGOs 
such as SHARP. Moreover, elders reported having contact with 
UNHCR and the Afghan consulate in Karachi and said that 
these institutions would involve them in solving conflicts with 
outsiders. 
Afghans are often described as knowing the loopholes and how 
to survive in Pakistan’s urban and rural settings (EI-BICC-KM-
016-Pak) because they successfully navigate a highly informal 
economy and use the venality of local structures, e.g., when 
earning a living from driving without being legally entitled to 
obtain drivers licences. While the existence of local networks 
of support could be interpreted as an indicator of Afghans’ 
self-reliance, the interviews revealed that immediate needs 
and everyday challenges—arising from inflation and rising 
prices for food, utility bills, rents, the need to purchase water 
daily, deficiencies in the process of opening bank accounts (see 
sub-section 3.5 for details) to name just a few—leave lower 
Strategies to decrease perceived physical insecurity include  
establishing rudimentary self-defence and local security man-
agement, e.g., guarding of the own neighbourhood in peri-urban 
camp-like settlements at night. Due to fear of the Pakistani  
security authorities and law enforcement agencies, especially 
the police, Afghans try to solve their conflicts among them-
selves whenever possible, even when members of the host com-
munity are involved. This is possible because of a strong tradi-
tion of local and communal conflict resolution mechanisms in 
Afghan and various Pakistani peoples’ cultures. Consequently, 
Afghans have their own conflict resolution bodies and attribute 
communal leadership and traditional authority structures 
(elders) an important role and significant authority for conflict 
resolution, mediation and representation towards the outside. 
This type of everyday protection limbo—manifest mainly in 
police harassment—is related to class in the sense that espe-
cially low-class Afghans suffer from socio-economic limbo 
and insufficient protection. It is nonetheless important to note 
that all Afghans, regardless of their socio-economic status and 
profession, depend on outside legal assistance from NGOs in 
certain situations. Given that the refugee status implies that 
even middle- and high-income Afghans cannot own property, 
conclude contracts or register businesses in their own name, 
they are highly dependent on members of the host community, 
their moral integrity and fair behaviour towards Afghans. We 
conclude that this dependency and everyday protection limbo 
concerns all Afghans as everybody is in legal limbo and subse-
quently depends on the goodwill and cooperation of locals (see 
sub-section 3.4). 
Resilience through local social networks of support? 
From the above, we can deduce that Afghans sustain their live-
lihoods and access to services with the help of local social net-
works. This begins with mutual support within the core family 
and extends to relatives, the wider kin network, ethno-religious 
support networks, the wider community of Afghans in the 
place of living and can also include specialised non-govern-
mental organisations that provide legal aid in particular, and 
the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR) which is 
in charge of dealing with Afghans’ needs in the Pakistani 
institutional environment. These support networks are spatially 
concentrated in the immediate environment of the individual or 
family in need and reflect (except for those with CAR and direct 
contact with NGOs) everyday interaction patterns. Again, this 
observation seems especially relevant for lower class Afghans 
who are facing precarity in one or several dimensions of their 
daily lives. 
The strategies for sustaining livelihoods within families 
include helping each other out with money. Some reported that 
better-off relatives, like a cousin or sister-in-law, helped out fi-
nancially (SSI-SHARP-AI-406-Pak), while others reported that 
their relatives often could not help in emergency cases because 




This sub-section looks into Theme 3 of TRAFIG “Connec-
tivity and mobility in the context of protracted displacement”. 
The main question it aims to address is: How do translocal and 
transnational networks shape refugees’ mobility aspirations, 
experiences and trajectories, and how do specific legal frame-
works and policies enable or inhibit this mobility? 
From cross-border displacement to developing 
translocal domestic connections 
The reason why millions of Afghan refugees decided to seek 
refuge in Pakistan in the 1980s was not only a matter of geo-
graphical proximity for Afghans of all backgrounds but also 
one of several other pull-factors. Most importantly, Cold War 
politics and US antagonism towards Iran after the events in 
1978/79 (hostage-taking in the US embassy in Tehran and  
Islamic revolution) conditioned that Pakistan started an immense 
humanitarian effort to receive and accommodate ‘refugees 
from communism’. International aid organisations provided 
everything from shelter to food and medical assistance. The 
average refugee who perceived the Soviet intervention as an 
attack on Islam opted for Pakistan because, for one, it was a 
Muslim country. For another, some refugees’ decisions to move 
to certain camps were not only made for their reputation in 
terms of organisation and services they provided (Quetta camp, 
for instance, SSI-SHARP-ZA-115-Pak), but which Afghan 
resistance fighters (so-called mujahedin) group was running 
the camp informally. With the war against the Soviets being 
organised from beyond the borders, refugee camps in particular 
played a role in sheltering, equipping, treating and healing 
mujahedin. Mujahedin ties and commander networks played 
a strong role in the exact choice of destination in Pakistan for 
Afghans throughout the 1980s (SSI-SHARP-ZA-113-Pak, SSI-
SHARP-NS-202-Pak). In our semi-structured interviews, many 
refugees, however, stated that they went where their relatives 
had already established themselves in Pakistan. These relatives 
also served as the main source of information. Thus, the second 
class Afghans struggling and reflect a high level of precarity. 
The temporariness of legal status related short-term perspec-
tives and the subsequent lack of formal mechanisms to access 
services (e.g., education, public sector employment) that enable 
social mobility constitute barriers to meaningful living that 
agency and coping strategies cannot fully substitute or remedy.  
Concluding remarks
Against the background of the depicted high level of uncer-
tainty that Afghans face in socio-economic and partly in 
security terms, the assessment of one academic expert sums up 
the limbo Afghans are caught in, thereby linking it to future 
perspectives of Afghan youth:  
“The majority of Afghans in Peshawar and Pakistan are 
young people; these young adults are looking for cer-
tainty in the future—whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan. 
Afghans in Pakistan have their livelihoods and secure 
their incomes; many run businesses of various scales, 
even if these are partially illegal. They lead a life in 
Pakistan where they would secure a certain future for 
themselves but expect improvements. […] The young gen-
eration badly wants some kind of certainty in the home 
country; the pull factors are not tangible. If this is not 
realised, their options are in Pakistan. Here, they know 
how to beat and even defeat ‘the system’ through illegal 
ways, but what they actually long for is to contribute to 
Pakistani society and economy in their own right, legally, 
and with an outlook of certainty in the future. They have 
the self-confidence that their presence can be turned 
into a meaningful contribution to Pakistani society and 
economy. A precondition is that the perceived restrictions 
should be removed. Afghans are tired of coping with 
restrictions (EInt-BICC-KM-016-Pak).
The analysis has shown that local networks mitigate socio-eco-
nomic and everyday protection limbo insufficiently in that 
they enable survival but not social mobility. Policymakers 
should thus make an effort to establish the necessary formal 
mechanisms that allow Afghans to access services to the extent 
needed, starting in the legal realm with public sector employ-
ment, resolving access barriers for higher education, entitling 
Afghans to have drivers licenses, register property, etc. 
Concrete measures need to improve the quality of education 
for Afghans and Pakistani citizens alike and ensure access to 
quality education in practice. The existing programmes to pro-
vide modes of informal or community schooling need further 
extension and financial support to avoid the education gap for 
children and especially girls who cannot reach schools safely 
due to their remote place of living. Moreover, skills- and voca-
tional training activities need to go beyond short-term courses 
and last at least six months.
Key findings
•	 Socio-economic limbo exists only for lower class Af-
ghans in Pakistan; the better-off do not live in precarity 
with all its effects.
•	 Afghans are not eligible to work in the public sector of 
Pakistan.
•	 Access to health care and education is theoretically 
provided, but the overburdening of the public health care 
and education systems means that access is limited in 
practice. 
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domestic connections evolved further through marriage rela-
tions. Those born in Pakistan married relatives or other members 
of the refugee community or relatives in Afghanistan, who were 
then brought to Pakistan. One respondent reported how his own 
family had grown to 300 members in Pakistan (SSI-SHARP-NS-
203-Pak). As a result, translocal connections between different 
hubs of Afghan residents evolved, in particular between the 
large cities Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta, leading to 
translocal mobility manifest in visits and further marriages (see 
also Map 1) with mobility trajectories along social relations. 
According to our survey, the social relations of most Afghans  
(63 per cent) are concentrated at their current place of living. Yet, 
37 per cent maintain social relations with people who live elsewhere, 
which we see as a key indicator of translocal connectivity. While 
gender, age, educational background or legal status did not seem to 
be essential factors that could explain the difference in translocal 
connections, the respondents’ place of living seems to make a 
difference. For example, a larger share of Afghan migrants living 
in Islamabad (46 per cent) seem to maintain social relations beyond 
their place of living than at the other sites (see Figures 5 and 6).
wave of refugees—displaced during the civil war from 1992 
onwards (cf. section 2)—largely relied on personal networks, 
either kin networks of relatives or refugees from the same 
location in Afghanistan who had moved to Pakistan earlier. 
The first wave of displaced (1980s) moved in large groups as 
entire extended families, lineage groups or village communities 
(Maley, 1992, p. 11), forming large convoys that often swelled 
during their journey to Pakistan because it fused with other ref-
ugee caravans (SSI-SHARP-NS-202-Pak). The later refugees in 
what can be called the third wave (after 2001) primarily moved 
as individual families or core segments of extended families 
searching for peace and better living conditions. 
The importance of local and transnational network relations 
for Afghan refugees’ mobility is confirmed by our survey, even 
though the share of respondents who actually received support for 
their move from Afghanistan to Pakistan is lower than expected 
(17 per cent). Among those who received assistance, 62 per cent 
relied on family members and/or friends who lived in Pakistan, 
while 44 per cent drew on support by relatives and/or friends in 
Afghanistan. Family members living in third countries such as 
Iran, people they had met along the way or smugglers were hardly 
mentioned as a source of support for these journeys.
After initial displacement from Afghanistan, the movement tra-
jectory often started with the move out from the relatives’ place 
or location to a place in Pakistan that was thought to offer better 
income and living opportunities. According to our survey, 
besides geographical proximity (40 per cent), the perceived 
improved economic conditions (mentioned by 62 per cent) and 
security situation (35 per cent) were decisive factors in Afghans’ 
decisions to move to the place where they currently live. The 
similarity of languages and traditions (mentioned by 12 per 
cent) had been another reason for the respondents’ mobility 
decision. Many (14 per cent) also stated that they came to this 
place to reunite with family members who had already lived 
there, and a few (4 per cent) had previously lived at the current 
place themselves. Both latter aspects point to the relevance of 
translocal social relations and own migration experiences as 
determinants in mobility decisions.
Displacement is often considered a temporary experience. For 
Afghans in Pakistan, however, it became a protracted situation 
to which they were forced to adapt. Respondents described how 
they adjusted in their temporary presence to a permanent settle-
ment over time. Latest by 1995, when Afghans were officially 
allowed to move out of the camps because international aid had 
stopped facilitating the camps16 , those who chose to remain in 
Pakistan went on to seek employment in the cities. Translocal 
16 The World Food Programme (WFP) and UNHCR terminated assistance to ref-
ugee camps on 30 September 1995, marking the beginning of a new phase—
sometimes euphemistically called ‘policy of self-reliance’—because it ended 
the “care and maintenance approach” (Fielden, 1998, p. 469). See also section 2.
Figure	5:	Number	of	respondents	at	our	study	sites	who	
maintain	translocal	social	relations	
Source:  TRAFIG survey (n=299)
Figure	6:	Share	of	respondents	at	our	study	sites	who	main-
tain	local,	translocal	and	transnational	social	relations	
Source:  TRAFIG survey (n=299)
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Several respondents reported that their parents and some 
siblings had moved back to Afghanistan in recent years for 
various reasons, one major factor being the harassment by the 
police and the perception that they cannot continue to live a life 
with dignity in Pakistan. The communication with returned 
family members and relatives mostly occurs over the phone, 
and relations are sustained by mutual visits, e.g. for funerals, 
marriages and the like. Sometimes, a deceased family member 
is brought back to be buried in Afghanistan, but often the 
funeral takes place in Pakistan. Several experts emphasised that 
split households among extended Afghan families are a reality, 
meaning that parts of the family live in Pakistan, the others in 
Our survey revealed that Afghans’ translocal figurations of 
displacement are by and large translocal family figurations. 
The quality and content of these translocal connections within 
Pakistan revolve around mutual support that is largely non-ma-
terial and manifests in moral support through consultation and 
advice. Typical channels of maintaining relations are via phone 
(75 per cent of respondents stated that they keep in contact with 
their ‘important persons’ this way). For 61 per cent, personal 
visits continue to be an essential way of maintaining the trans-
local figurations in which they are embedded.  
The scope and quality of cross-border connections
Map	1:	Displacement	and	movement	trajectories	of	two	Afghan	families	
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He introduced them to an Iranian smuggler who trafficked 
drugs and humans and agreed to take them to Mashhad. 
When he learned that they could not afford the cost of this 
trip, the smuggler suggested that, should the police arrest 
them, Moosa should take the blame for the drugs that he was 
smuggling and accept its consequences. Moosa agreed with 
the deal. They managed to safely arrive in Mashhad. From 
there, they paid a bus driver to take them to Tehran in his 
bunk to avoid getting caught. Moosa and his wife stayed in 
a city west of Tehran province, while Moosa’s son went on 
to Tehran for better employment opportunities. He still lives 
there and works as a daily construction worker. He married 
an Afghan woman who is irregular as well (BI-BICC-SA-
102-IRN).
The examples show how personal life trajectories escape neat 
categorisations as a refugee or a (labour) migrant, between 
temporariness, permanence and circular movement. Both cases 
also highlight the degree to which these individuals are highly 
self-reliant but at the same time vulnerable. 
Afghanistan, thus attributing normalcy to translocal lives (EI-
BICC-KM-010-Pak, EI-BICC-KM-016-Pak). Moreover, these 
networks exist against the background of manifold cross-border 
dynamics and historical cross-border mobility (EI-BICC-KM-
015-Pak) that was both amplified and immobilised because of war. 
The complexity and multifariousness of Afghans’ presence 
in Pakistan and Iran is visualised in Map 1, which shows the 
displacement and movement trajectories of two families—one 
towards Iran, the other towards Pakistan. 
Moosa—an elderly Hazara man who lives in a city west 
of Tehran—was born in Afghanistan’s northeastern Bada-
khshan province. As a young man, he moved to Kabul in 
search for work, engaging in daily jobs as a labourer there 
in the mid-1970s. After the Marxist coup d’état in April 
1978, he and his family moved back to Badakhshan, where 
he remained until the Taliban took over in the mid-1990s. 
Threatened by the persecution of Hazara in Afghanistan, 
Moosa decided to flee with his family to Iran. He was inter-
cepted by Taliban forces and arrested, tortured in prison 
and exploited for forced labour until the International 
Committee of the Red Cross negotiated his release a long 
time later. Set free, he wanted to use smuggling channels to 
reach Iran. However, the smuggler advised him to move via 
Pakistan because of the lower risk of getting caught by the 
Taliban. After arriving in Khyber, a small town in Pakistan’s 
tribal areas, Moosa worked as a labourer to pay the smug-
gler and save money to move on to Iran via Balochistan. 
From there, he managed to get to Zahedan and, accompa-
nied by a fuel smuggler, on to Birjand. He never again heard 
of his family he had lost when they were intercepted by the 
Taliban. In Iran, Moosa lived as an undocumented Afghan. 
He married a registered Hazara and started another family. 
Later, one of his daughters followed her husband back to 
Afghanistan. When he tried to relocate his family to Tehran 
because there were no good job opportunities in Birjand, he 
and his family were arrested on the way. His wife’s Amayesh 
card—a registration card for Afghans in Iran—was voided, 
and all of them were deported to Afghanistan (Herat) after a 
one-month stay in Sang Sefid camp. They moved on to Kabul 
and stayed at Moosa’s daughter’s house for several months 
and later with his brother’s family. His brother found a job 
for Moosa’s eldest son, who then married his cousin and 
stayed in Kabul. However, when Moosa and his second son 
could not find a proper job after 18 months, they decided to 
return to Iran. Moosa’s brother introduced him to a cousin 
of his wife who smuggled people to Iran. They travelled 
to Nimrooz and met the smuggler. Because of their family 
relationship, he agreed to smuggle Moosa and his family 
free of charge. The smuggler took them to Dust Mohammad 
town in the north of Sistan-Balouchistan province, Iran. 
Case	1:		Moosa’s	family’s	displacement	trajectory
Note:  The case study from Iran has been collected by Shamin Asghari, who 
contributed to our TRAFIG research by conducting five expert inter-
views and ten biographical interviews with Afghans displaced in Iran. 
Waqar came to Pakistan as a three-year-old with his family 
and close relatives. They left Imam Sahib in Kunduz Prov-
ince in 1991 due to instability in Afghanistan, after the father 
had sold his merchant shop. They arrived in Peshawar via 
Torkham border crossing, and some relatives, including his 
parents, moved on to Karachi after around two weeks. In 
Karachi, his father started working as a labourer in a private 
company and rented a small house in Al Asif Square area. 
Since his father had brought earnings and savings with him at 
the time of migration, he was able to rent and open a merchant 
shop after five years. Some of his relatives returned to Afghan-
istan in 2003 after the new government was formed, trusting 
that peace will prevail. Since then, Waqar and his father have 
visited Afghanistan many times, e.g., to attend marriage and 
funeral ceremonies. Waqar’s sister is married to one of his 
close relatives in Afghanistan. His father made the pilgrimage 
of Hajj from Afghanistan on his Afghan passport in 2016 and 
returned from Afghanistan to Karachi via the Chaman border 
crossing (SSI-SHARP-ZA-109-PAK). 
Case	2:		Movement	pattern	of	Waqar’s	extended	family
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to Pakistan or when male relatives went to Iran from Pakistan 
for labour migration (SSI-SHARP-NS-206-Pak). In the latter 
case, the respondents mentioned that when family members  
had migrated to Iran illegally for work in low-skill jobs, they 
were in constant fear of being caught and subsequently could 
not move around. Interviewees perceived their own mobility  
options in Pakistan as much more liberal and freer (SSI-
SHARP-ZA-101-Pak). Once the Iranian police had caught their 
Afghan relative, he was deported to Afghanistan and returned 
to the family in Pakistan via the Chaman border crossing.
Mainly business networks and family networks of upper-middle 
class Afghans have moved beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Iran. Thus, carpet businessmen spoke of travels to Russia, 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, with their carpets being exported 
globally and sent to Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
the United States and South Africa, for example (SSI-SHARP-
NS-201-202-Pak). Overall, respondents mentioned kin relations 
with family members in Turkey, Canada, the United States, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Belgium and Iraq (note that some of the 
countries mentioned in semi-structured interviews where not 
among those recalled by survey respondents, see Figure 7). Apart 
from the networks in Canada and Turkey, relatives abroad were 
not considered precedents that would help respondents realise 
their own mobility aspirations of moving abroad.
Moving to settle in Turkey was reported to be highly attractive 
for some well-off Afghans who possessed the financial means 
of investment required by the Turkish government as a precon-
dition for immigrants to acquire Turkish citizenship (SSI-
SHARP-ZA-103, SSI-SHARP-ZA-115-Pak). The clear path to 
obtaining Turkish citizenship, the prospect of freedom of move-
ment in Turkey and the precedence set in their own extended 
We found that current connectivity is constituted by growing 
but relatively close-knit, extended family networks across 
borders that are also family figurations and perpetuated by 
intra-family marriages the significance of which Williams 
(2010) has shown for Asia. Afghan women who were born and 
grew up in Afghanistan marry a relative in Pakistan and settle 
there and the other way around, Afghan women from Pakistan 
marry a relative in Pakistan and move in with his family there 
or return with him to Afghanistan. As with translocal domestic 
networks, personal exchanges through visits and needs-based 
contact via phone, etc. between the elders of the families char-
acterise the quality of relations. This allows the exchange of 
family news and information. In many cases, Afghans arrange 
their Afghan identity documents (tazkeera and passports) with 
the support of relatives and travel to Afghanistan to receive the 
documents. Several cases were reported where respondents or 
their relatives perceived this as an urgent need and precondition 
to be able to make the Hajj from Afghanistan (SSI-SHARP-ZA-
113-Pak). Afghans’ legal status in Pakistan deprives them of 
the opportunity to make the Hajj from their place of residence 
in Pakistan. Thus, arranging documents in and travel from 
Afghanistan is more feasible. After returning from the Hajj 
to Afghanistan, the hajji (pilgrim) takes the road via Chaman 
border crossing and re-enters Pakistan.   
Our research found that translocal and transnational mobility 
within the region, i.e., extending from Pakistan to Afghanistan 
and in some cases also to Iran, is more relevant than mobility 
and networks further abroad (see Figure 7). The qualitative 
interviews indicate that this could be especially true for lower 
class Afghans. However, the survey data do not corroborate this 
impression. In some cases, connections with relatives in Iran 
are either sustained from the original displacement when fam-
ilies decided to split up and one part migrated to Iran, the other 
Figure	7:	Countries	where	key	contacts	of	Afghan	migrants	live
Source:  TRAFIG survey (n=299), responses of 111 Afghans in Pakistan who 
maintain social relations to persons living at a different place than 
themselves 
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educated and am struggling to get a government or a private job 
due to my Afghan nationality. I prefer to go to a country where 
I have a secure future” (SSI-SHARP-ZA-109-Pak). It is further 
corroborated by an expert: “The third-generation Afghans in 
Pakistan will rather go to Abu Dhabi, the Gulf states or Europe 
for working than return to Afghanistan” (EI-BICC-KM-
001-Pak). Many of our respondents have, however, been aware 
of the multiple barriers to their mobility and named visa and 
border restrictions (65 per cent), high costs of the journey and 
their own lack of financial means (55 per cent), lack of informa-
tion on how to move (29 per cent) and lack of support by others 
to embark on a migration journey (13 per cent) as primary 
reasons why they cannot realise their ambitions to migrate.
Non-return, immobility  and circular mobility as 
features of protractedness 
Non-return
It is consistent with the widespread desire to stay in Pakistan 
that three out of four Afghans do not intend to return to Afghani-
stan. Their main reasons are that they are afraid to return home 
due to persisting violence and insecurity (84 per cent) and 
because most of their family members and friends also live in 
Pakistan and do not wish to return (37 per cent). One-third of 
respondents mentioned that they lost everything (their house, 
livelihoods and other assets) when they had to flee and thus 
have ‘nothing to return to’. The survey and our qualitative 
interviews show that older Afghans who belong to the first 
generation of Afghan refugees (see section 2) have no intention 
of returning. The vast majority of those who are considering 
return (64 per cent), however, stated that the presence of close 
family members would be their central motive to (temporarily) 
return to their former place of living. Only a few (8 per cent) 
said that they would only be willing to return if peace is re-
stored and security conditions are improved. Thus, we can con-
clude that despite continuous bonds to their place of origin and 
existing transnational family relations, it is insecurity as much 
as the governance regime that hinders return and cross-border 
mobility. As one expert put it, “Pull factors in Afghanistan do 
not exist as of now” (EI-BICC-KM-015-Pak). It must be ex-
pected that the Taliban takeover of the country in August 2021 
and their declaration that the war has come to an end will not 
immediately incentivise large-scale return from Pakistan. Even 
those considering life in the emirate will be wary of moving 
until they can see economic prospects that allow their families 
to make a living at the same level or better than in Pakistan.
Immobilising policies
Another important observation is that keeping the most signif-
icant networks running is becoming increasingly problematic 
due to immobilising policies and the legal limbo Afghans find 
themselves in, as described in sub-section 3.1. Travel across 
provinces in Pakistan constitutes a challenge for many re-
family of moving to Turkey and having success after three to 
five years were uncontested. In contrast, migration chances to 
Canada were less tangible. One respondent knew that the Cana-
dian government had issued an immigration stop in 2017, and 
even now that the ban was lifted, migration for family reunion 
turned out to be difficult as she presented her case: 
I have four brothers and two sisters, my younger brother 
and I live in Pakistan with our families, the rest of my 
siblings moved from Pakistan to Canada about nineteen 
years ago. My four uncles and aunts also live in Canada, 
all of them in Quebec. I am in regular contact with them. 
My brothers help me financially; sometimes they send 
me money every month, sometimes not; my sisters do not 
help me. As my younger brother is also in Pakistan, my 
brothers in Canada say that they can call only one family 
to live with them. So, it’s not decided yet whether my 
family or my younger brother’s family will go to Canada. 
My immigration was rejected, and my brother in Canada 
has discussed with the authorities that if they only allow 
my family to come then, he will bear all expenses, but it 
didn’t work. I went to an organisation to seek assistance 
in this matter, but it refused to give that assistance (SSI-
SHARP-AI-404-Pak). 
Relatives who had settled in Norway and Germany had 
migrated via Iran and Turkey since 2016. One Afghan told us 
about his three nephews who are now in Germany, Turkey and 
Norway. “They went to these countries by facing great hard-
ships. First, they went to Iran and then to Turkey and then to 
Germany and other countries. They are not in contact with me 
but with their families. They went and never came back. One 
of them could not come to attend his mother’s funeral” (SSI-
SHARP-AI-407-Pak). The respondent added that he is happy to 
stay in Pakistan. 
This intention to stay reflects the position of the vast majority 
(82 per cent) of Afghan refugees we spoke to. Only a minority 
of 18 per cent aim to move to another country to live there in the 
future. Interesting differences are revealed when age, educa-
tional status and study sites are considered. Respondents living 
in Karachi (in the settlements at Al-Asif Square and Jhangabad) 
and in Haji refugee camp in Peshawar were less inclined to stay 
than at all other sites—around one-third want to move on from 
there. Generally speaking, the younger generation of Afghans, 
especially those born in Pakistan and those who are better 
educated, seek to move to third countries to realise their social 
mobility aspirations. The share of those who aspire to perma-
nently migrate to another country—the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates were most often 
mentioned—is highest in the age groups of 20 to 29 and 30  
to 39. This is also reflected in the statement of a young Afghan 
who told us: “I do not see a bright future in Pakistan as I am 
Figure	8:	Defining	translocal	figurations	of	displacement	along	five	core	themes
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•	 Gender: The suspension of irregular border crossings affects 
females from the said provinces because since then mostly 
men have taken the hassle of the detour via Punjab alone 
when travelling to Afghanistan to visit the extended family 
or participate in festivities, cultural events or funerals. 
Women are thus increasingly becoming excluded, their rela-
tionships more distant and their connectivity weakened. 
•	 Generational: Under the given circumstances, mostly elders 
and first-generation Afghans who had migrated to Pakistan 
keep up physical mobility for the mentioned occasions and 
show presence to secure assets from land and property in 
Afghanistan.
•	 Future: We observe a decline in physical mobility with time 
passing because many, if not most, of the second and third 
generation Afghans who were born in Pakistan do not have 
the same emotional connection and sense of belonging to 
Afghanistan. They rather want to naturalise in Pakistan. De-
spite the difficulties they might face every day—and which 
among lower class Afghans are very similar to the daily 
challenges of ordinary Pakistanis—they have no aspirations 
to return. 
We consider this trend of policy-induced immobilisation and 
immobility to constitute one feature of protractedness, besides 
re-migration to Pakistan after initial return to Afghanistan and 
the circular migration patterns (see below). 
Circular mobilities
Several of our respondents had re-migrated to Pakistan after 
their initial return to Afghanistan for mainly two reasons: The 
lack of security in Afghanistan (SSI-SHARP-NS-202-Pak) and 
livelihood options (SSI-SHARP-NS-203-Pak). The narrative 
of a woman who re-migrated with her husband and brother is 
insightful in several respects: 
We went to Afghanistan with the intention to live there 
permanently, but my husband failed to find a job; there 
are no employment opportunities. I wore the veil but 
never a burqa. One day after I visited a doctor, I received 
a warning by the Taliban that they would punish me if I 
was seen again without a burqa outside. When we left Af-
ghanistan via Torkham, the officer cut our PoR cards into 
pieces; we returned through Chaman border and Quetta. 
The authorities at Chaman border post humiliated us; my 
husband and brother were beaten for no cause. My father 
also plans to come back to Pakistan because he is not 
well. He bought land there to build a house but has not yet 
been able to start (SSI-SHARP-AI-402-Pak). 
The quote also points to a third motive for re-migration, which 
is related to the availability of health services and treatment 
(SSI-SHARP-AI-401-Pak, SSI-SHARP-AI-411-Pak). Espe-
cially for serious illnesses and long-term health treatment 
needs, families consider moving (back) to Pakistan. Whereas 
spondents. One respondent pointed out how mobility became 
constrained over time: “In the 1980s and 1990s, it was very 
easy to travel anywhere in Pakistan; there was no one who 
would stop you. But now it is very difficult, especially in Punjab 
because the Punjabi police harass refugees and extort money 
from us” (SSI-SHARP-ZA-121-Pak). Even holders of PoR cards 
face discrimination in cross-provincial travel (EI-BICC-KM-
011-Pak, SSI-SHARP-NS-201-Pak, SSI-SHARP-AI-402-Pak), 
and 58 per cent of these holders mentioned that they had experi-
enced mobility restrictions in Pakistan. Due to the fear of abuse 
and detention (cf. 3.4), many Afghans thus tend to stay in their 
residential locality and avoid domestic travel if they do not have 
cards. As one expert explained, 
For domestic mobility, PoR cards do not enable freedom 
of movement. Especially when crossing provincial 
borders, Afghans face a lot of problems. For example, 
if coming from Quetta, people are stopped at D.I. Khan 
border check posts and are usually not allowed to pass. 
Even drivers get blamed by the police at the check posts 
for transporting Afghans in their cars. So, it is increasingly 
hard to find any driver because they fear problems with 
the security authorities. Afghans are not even allowed to 
buy tickets to travel by bus or train; they are not sold to 
Afghans (EI-BICC-KM-010-Pak). 
In contrast to other situations of protracted displacement across 
the world, many Afghans have actually been quite mobile and 
regularly engaged in circular mobility to and from their country 
of origin but also across territorial borders within the region. 
Almost one-quarter of survey respondents have returned at 
least once to Afghanistan since their initial displacement—the 
share is higher among men (28 per cent) than women (17 per 
cent); higher among the younger (29 per cent of those <40 yrs.) 
than older Afghans (16 per cent of those >50 yrs.); and higher in 
study sites closer to the Afghan border (47 per cent of those in-
terviewed in Peshawar) than those farther away (e.g. 9 per cent 
in Karachi). Those who did return temporarily came back four 
times on average. Transnational mobility is, however, increas-
ingly impeded since efforts to seal the Afghan–Pakistani border 
and to introduce strict visa regulations are being implemented 
as part of the government of Pakistan’s policies (cf. sub-section 
3.1.). Increasing immobility leads to four types of effects: 
•	 Spatially-regional: Due to the strict entry and exit rules 
introduced at the Torkham border crossing in Khyber-Pa-
khtunkhwa (KP) province since 2016/17, Afghans living 
in Punjab, KP, and in the Islamabad area face mobility 
restrictions because they cannot use the border crossing and 
must go via Chaman crossing in Baluchistan where a strict 
visa regime is not yet being implemented and everybody can 
de facto pass. Afghans settling in southern KP, Karachi and 
Baluchistan do not face these restrictions in their cross-
border interactions. 
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Concluding remarks
The evolution of translocal connections is strongly entwined 
with Afghans’ displacement and migration trajectories that 
stretch over generations. Our research found that translocal and 
transnational mobility from Pakistan and Iran to Afghanistan is 
of higher relevance than mobility and networks further abroad, 
especially among lower class Afghans. Among the educated 
members of second- and third-generation Afghans in Paki-
stan, mobility aspirations are oriented towards third countries, 
whereas first-generation Afghan refugees who migrated mainly 
in the 1980s and 1990s prefer to stay in Pakistan. Only few are 
likely to opt for return if the conditions allow it. As resettlement 
quotas for Afghans have become negligible, increasingly illegal 
channels are being sought in search of a better life abroad. The 
interviews revealed that many Afghans would prefer an option 
of existence that allows them to be rooted in Afghanistan and 
their current residence in Pakistan or Iran. We detected several 
immobilising policies that hamper connectivity and the upkeep 
of networks within Pakistan and Iran but also across the border 
with Afghanistan. We have shown that this immobility but also 
certain types of mobility, that is re-migration or circular migra-
tion, constitute features of protractedness in Afghans’ displace-
ment but not a way out of protractedness. Overall, we find that 
the role of Afghans’ translocal and transnational networks to 
end protracted displacement is limited. 
previously, with unchecked travel also via Torkham, hospital 
visits in Peshawar, Rawalpindi and other places were normal for 
many Afghans and constituted one type of circular migration, 
the tightening of borders is increasingly narrowing this option. 
Another type of circular migration revealed in the interviews is 
made up by scoping visits that seem to have been very common, 
i.e., where Afghans went to Afghanistan to assess the situation 
and their prospects for making a living ‘back home’ (SSI-
SHARP-NS-204-Pak). Besides, there are many cases where 
Afghans travel to Afghanistan regularly to secure their assets 
in terms of land and property for a possible return in the future 
or should emergencies necessitate their sale. One example of 
this is that of the family head who sold his land in Afghanistan 
to afford the treatment of his wife when she was in critically 
ill (SSI-SHARP-ZA-101-Pak). Other types of circular mobility 
include the return of undocumented Afghans after they were 
deported to Afghanistan (SSI-SHARP-AI-407-Pak, EI-BICC-
KM-007-Pak). What immediate return deportation can look 
like is described by the following respondent: 
I was charged with crimes under section 354 and 452 
of the Pakistan Penal Code, a FIR [First Information 
Report] was lodged against me, and after being tried in 
court, I was jailed for three years. Later, I was proven 
innocent and got an order of acquittal. However, under 
section 14 Foreigners Act, the court ordered my deporta-
tion to Afghanistan with a fine of five thousand Rupees. I 
was deported through Torkham Border, where my uncle 
was already present and picked me up immediately to take 
me back to Peshawar (SSI-SHARP-AI-407-Pak).
Hajj-travel and labour migration to Iran also fall into the 
category of circular mobility, but the latter has been reported 
less in our sample. Finally, those going back and forth based 
on Afghan passports and Pakistani visas for business purposes 
constitute a new group of circular migrants. This mode of 
transnational livelihood-making and connectivity suits espe-
cially Afghan businessmen with less robust documents such as 
ACCs. One carpet businessman, who had migrated to Pakistan 
from Jawzjan in 2008, that is after the PoR card registration 
process, reported that he had decided to return to Afghanistan 
due to constant police harassment in 2016 and subsequently 
re-migrated to Pakistan with an Afghan passport and business 
visa after one month. Ever since, he has been going back and 
forth every one to two months, while his personal relationships 
are mainly in Afghanistan, not in Pakistan (SSI-SHARP-ZA-
103-Pak). From the spectrum of interviews conducted, we can 
conclude that many Afghans would prefer a mode of exist-
ence where they can legitimately live transnational lives with 
legal options to maintain cross-border and translocal relations 
through regular visits and based on freedom of mobility within 
Pakistan. As of now, GoP policies and the state of insecurity 
in Afghanistan adversely affect their ability to maintain the 
previous level of connectivity. 
Key findings
•	 Most Afghans living in Pakistan intend to stay in the 
country, particularly first-generation Afghan refugees 
who migrated in the 1980s and 1990s. Among the 
educated members of the second and third generation 
of Afghans in Pakistan, many aspire to move on to third 
countries outside the region. Only few opt for return if 
the conditions allow it, yet an increase in returnees is 
highly unlikely in view of the situation in August 2021. 
•	 Translocal mobility in Pakistan and transnational move-
ments in the region, extending mainly to Afghanistan 
and Iran, are more significant than movements further 
abroad.   
•	 Pakistani government policies and the absence of na-
tional refugee law—while aiming to incentivise return—
have an increasingly immobilising effect on translocal 
domestic and transnational connectivity.
•	 Many Afghan refugees have family members who live in 
other parts of Pakistan or other countries. The role of 
these translocal and transnational networks to end pro-
tracted displacement, for instance by providing financial 
support, is limited. 
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ents also did not speak negatively about their relations to Paki-
stani ‘locals’. A Pashto-speaking Afghan housewife who lives 
in a low-income household in peri-urban Lahore, for instance, 
told us: 
The locals are kind enough with us, and they tolerate 
us in their country. […] Our local neighbours help us in 
hospitals and in banks because we cannot speak Urdu 
very fluently and we do not have the right documents. It is 
locals who helped us renting a house and buying a motor-
bike (SSI-SHARP-AI-417-Pak). 
This quote is indicative in several respects: (1) It reveals 
cooperative relations and Afghans’ dependency on Pakistani 
citizens in managing anything that requires legal documents; 
(2) it hints at barriers to local integration and self-reliance 
because of insufficient language skills in addition to lack of 
legal recognition; and (3) the expression ‘kind enough with us’ 
in combination with her saying ‘tolerating us in their country’ 
indicates that the woman is aware of the rampant view among 
hosts that refugees are an additional burden in the complex and 
difficult socio-economic and political setting of Pakistan.
Fields of interaction
Our research found that Afghans and Pakistani hosts interact 
in a variety of fields daily: Through work relations as em-
ployers and employees, as shopkeepers, vendors, tailors, etc,. as 
customers and clients, as landlords and tenants, as neighbours, 
worshippers in the same mosque, as teachers and students. As 
a rule, interactions prevail among Afghans and Pakistanis of 
a similar socio-economic background, which has to do with 
the classed spatial separation described in sub-section 3.2. 
Bridging class relations are rare for the fields of interaction 
discussed here. Moreover, while some of these relations are 
purely professional, others are characterised by dependency, 




This section investigates Theme 4 of TRAFIG: ‘Building alli-
ances: Displaced people’s integration and intergroup relations 
with ‘hosts’’. The main question this section aims to address 
is: “Which processes structure inter-group relations between 
refugees and hosts and displaced persons’ pathways of local 
integration?” 
Intergroup relations from the perspective of  
Afghans 
In our survey, we asked Afghan refugees who they regularly 
spend time with. Most respondents (87 per cent) stated that they 
normally meet other persons from their ‘home community’, i.e. 
other Afghans coming from the same region, and three out four 
Afghans replied that they meet members from their (extended) 
family who live at the same place. They often mentioned 
persons they know from work (24 per cent), members of the 
same ethnic group (19 per cent) and people they know from 
the mosque (17 per cent) (see Figure 8). Pakistani citizens are 
regular contacts of 15 per cent of the respondents, and more 
frequently by men (17 per cent) than by women (12 per cent), for 
example
We also enquired whether the respondents felt accepted or 
rejected by other people, including Pakistani citizens, at their 
place of living. With 82 per cent, the vast majority responded 
that they felt accepted and only few (4 per cent) said they felt 
rejected by the host community; the remaining 14 percent had 
reportedly experienced both acceptance and rejection in the 
past. We interpret this finding as an indicator of a relatively 
high social cohesion among residents of Afghani and Pakistani 
origin. In semi-structured and biographic interviews, respond-
Source:  Trafig survey (n=254)
Figure	8:	Afghan	refugees'	local	network	relations	at	their	place	of	living
Collaboration and conflict
By far the most significant interaction between both commu-
nities comes from Afghans’ limited rights to purchase and 
register property, such as motorbikes, apartments, houses, etc. 
in their own name. They thus depend on friends, neighbours, 
landlords, employers and others who either lend them their 
identity cards (CNICs) to purchase property, access hospitals 
and doctors (SSI-SHARP-NS-202-Pak), or act as guarantors in 
case of disputes and in dealing with local authorities or banks 
and help them to get children registered at school (SSI-SHARP-
ARK-305-Pak). According to respondents, conflicts occur 
mainly about financial issues and false claims of ownership by 
Pakistani partners. As one Afghan waiter in a restaurant re-
ported about his Afghan colleague, “He had bought a motorbike 
using the name of a local person, but upon purchase, the local 
partner claimed that it was his own bike. Tension arose, and 
some persons from the local Pakistani community supported 
the Afghan and compelled his Pakistani partner to quit his 
claim and hand over the bike to the real owner, which he did 
in the end” (SSI-SHARP-ZA-112-Pak). In another case, where 
a dispute arose over financial issues in the market, the market 
union was said to have settled the issue without any discrimina-
tion. It is noteworthy that the market union consists of Pakistani 
and Afghan members (SSI-SHARP-ZA-109-Pak). An Afghan 
respondent reported a case where he caused an accident hitting 
a child ‘of a local man’ with his motorbike: 
The child’s leg was broken. People gathered at the site 
and started blaming me. They called the police and 
brought the child to the hospital. The police took me to the 
police station. Fortunately, my local [Pakistani] friends 
and shopkeepers went to the child’s father to ask for for-
giveness and explained that it had not been my fault. The 
child had suddenly run into my motorbike, and I could not 
evade him. Upon the insistence of my local friends and 
colleagues, the father gave in and accepted the offered 
compensation. I was then released from police custody” 
(SSI-SHARP-ZA-115-Pak).     
This type of conflict resolution among conflict parties, which 
involves an agreement about compensation as a precondition 
for disengaging the authorities and formal legal procedures, is 
common. It involves local representatives with some kind of 
authority, such as members of professional unions or (tribal) 
elders and respected persons of the community who act as 
mediators. This is another example: A respondent’s brother was 
once brutally beaten ‘by a local young man’ when they were 
playing cricket. He approached the tribal elder of the perpe-
trator, telling him that his brother was innocent and beaten 
without reason. Once the elder had called on the Pakistani 
boy with his father and found him indeed guilty of beating the 
consultative or conflict resolution exchanges. In personal (e.g., 
tenant-landlord) and friendship-relations, moral support, ad-
vice, and—if necessary— material assistance is naturally more 
common than in business networks. Relations between neigh-
bours were commonly framed as positive, and respondents 
described interactions where Afghans engaged in occasional 
visits of their Pakistani neighbours for festivities such as Eid ul-
Adha or marriages and where they expressed their condolences 
during funerals. Close personal networks and trust relations 
with Pakistani citizens are rooted in long-term relationships 
based on joint work experience or jointly spent schoolyears or 
childhood days in the same neighbourhood. The latter is par-
ticularly relevant for the younger generation. Young people also 
reported more often spending their leisure time with Pakistani 
peers, e.g., playing cricket or football, compared with previous 
generations of Afghans. The fact that the young generation 
is more likely to have childhood friends and relations with 
members of the host community seems to bode well for a future 
mutual understanding, trust, and local social integration. 
In one instance, we found that such close personal relationships 
of trust nearly circumvented the formal rule prohibiting Af-
ghans’ public sector employment. In this case, an unregistered 
Afghan was paid to work at a motorway toll station because he 
was familiar with the work and known to the local boss. 
The respondent is doing a government job at toll plaza 
standing in for an employee who died in an accident. 
That employee was his friend. He used to visit him. So he 
became familiar with the procedure and how the work is 
done. Then the boss at toll plaza asked him to do the job 
and gave him money on a daily basis for that. According 
to the respondent, there are opportunities for refugees, 
but if a person does not have a card, he can do nothing. 
He does not have a card (SSI-SHARP-AI-407-Pak).
As this excerpt from the interview notes shows, the employ-
ment was informal after all; however, it meant much-sought 
recognition for the respondent. In another case, a master tailor 
reported how he had managed to establish a successful business 
with a city-wide reputation among customers in Karachi. Due 
to the social status achieved, his elder son was able to marry a 
girl from a Pakistani family. Moreover, he reported: “One of my 
local friends suggested that his daughter should marry my son, 
which I happily accepted. Now I have two grandsons of four 
and two years respectively” (SSI-SHARP-ZA-119-Pak). Inter-
marriages are common, mostly between Afghan females and 
Pakistani males, but also—albeit to a lesser extent—the other 
way round. In theory, Afghan wives of Pakistani husbands are 
eligible to apply for and receive Pakistani citizenship (EI-
BICC-KM-012-Pak). However, the process is slow and highly 
bureaucratic, and seemingly arbitrary at times. Afghan males 
can never obtain citizenship through marriage with Pakistani 
nationals. 
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Afghan for no reason, he judged that the Afghan must be given 
50,000 PKR as compensation. It was not the amount of money 
that the respondent praised and was thankful for, but the fact 
that the elder had judged without bias, thus truly serving justice 
from the perspective of the Afghan respondent (SSI-SHARP-
ZA-127-Pak). 
One expert mentioned that many guarantor relationships of 
Pakistani and Afghan partners, which enabled Afghans to 
purchase or register property based on a Pakistani partner’s 
legal document, often involved some payment of benefits for 
the local partner (EI-BICC-KM-010-Pak). This could not be 
verified from the semi-structured interviews as respondents 
did not explicitly mention it. They were eager to point out 
instances of positive cooperation, for example, where a doctor 
in a local hospital gave the Afghan patient 100,000 PKR as gift 
so he would be able to get the surgery and further treatment for 
his leg after a motorbike accident (SSI-SHARP-ZA-113-Pak). 
Such help, however, was not unilateral. One case was reported 
where an Afghan provided a 50,000 PKR-loan for a local boy 
of the neighbourhood to enable him to study at university 
(SSI-SHARP-ZA-121-Pak). However, from among the respond-
ents of the middle and upper-income class, one respondent 
expressed that he is in constant fear when engaging in transac-
tions involving movable or immovable property, stating: “I am 
obliged to trust locals. Should/whenever tensions arise between 
any Afghan with refugee status and locals, we try to solve it 
through negotiations” (SSI-SHARP-ZA-201-Pak). Several 
instances where locals do not pay adequately for services or 
products purchased from Afghans (SSI-SHARP-AI-403-Pak, 
SSI-SHARP-ZA-122-Pak) or defaulted on credit repayments 
(SSI-SHARP-ZA-104-Pak) were mentioned.
Observations on Afghans’ collective subjectivity: Local integra-
tion vs. belonging 
In the majority of responses to the question of how Afghan men 
and women assess their relations with the host community over 
time, the typical answer was that ‘relations are improving day 
by day’—paired with expressions articulating confidence and 
hope that this would be the case (e.g., SSI-SHARP-ZA-204-
205-206-Pak). Aware of the recent conflictual history of polit-
ical scapegoating of Afghans, acts of exclusion17 , and de facto 
forced returns by the government (see section 2), we suspect 
that this mantra of hoped-for improvement over time points to 
the carefully hidden, maybe not acknowledged and possibly 
even actively rejected underlying emotions of hurt, non-com-
fort and individual fear of the respondents, connected in par-
ticular to politically motivated incidents after December 2014. 
We argue that these issues which respondents did not talk about 
17 None of the respondents mentioned, for example, the closure of Afghan refu-
gee schools and the exclusion of Afghan refugee children from Pakistani state 
schools since the beginning of May 2016 (HRW, 2017, p. 24).
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reveal something about Afghans’ collective subjectivities18, 
their feeling of vulnerability, fear to some extent and feeling 
not recognised and accepted. Especially the young generation 
is feeling frustrated for lack of career options regarding social 
mobility and future (un)certainties (see sub-section 3.2). 
Respondents’ verbal framing of their relations with Pakistani 
citizens (‘locals’) in the semi-structured interview responses 
is also revealing: While Afghans commonly distinguished 
between normal and neutral vs. close/ friendly contacts 
(SSI-SHARP-ZA-103-Pak, SSI-SHARP-NS-207-Pak), few 
interviewees also spoke of ‘superficial’ relations (SSI-SHARP-
NS-202-Pak, SSI-SHARP-NS-203-Pak), and one made a clear 
distinction between interaction—which he has with Pakistanis 
on a daily basis—and contacts with hosts, which he said are 
limited. The following quote demonstrates that here again, 
generational differences are relevant: “I have contact and 
interactions with locals, but my elder son has close and friendly 
interactions with locals. It is also his business to contact locals 
to sell out the scrap metals. […] I think that here in Karachi, 
locals are neutral but in Quetta, the host community is very 
friendly and helpful” (SSI-SHARP-ZA-120-Pak). The quote 
also introduces regional variation in the intensity and closeness 
of contacts experienced. 
In Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (Peshawar), the lan-
guage, tribal background and traditions (including food, style 
of living and behaviour) of the locals are even more similar to 
that of Afghans. As one interview account indicates, language 
skills give confidence and can also help avoid police harass-
ment: “When I travel in Pakistan and am being investigated by 
the police, they normally let me go when I speak Urdu fluently 
with them because they think I am a Pakistani. I also speak 
Roghni, Saraiki and Pashto” (SSI-SHARP-AI-407-Pak). Only 
in Sindh (even though in Karachi as the capital of Sindh, large 
number of Pashtuns have been settling for decades and Pashto 
is spoken widely in certain quarters) and Punjab (Lahore) the 
lack of Urdu or other local language skills poses a certain chal-
lenge for local acceptance (EI-BICC-KM-007-Pak, EI-BICC-
KM-003-Pak). And as has been mentioned before, the second 
and third generation Afghans who were born, raised and 
—ideally—educated in Pakistan, speak Urdu fluently and master 
English depending on the school they went to. Many of these 
second and third generation Afghans we spoke to expressed 
18 Collective subjectivity refers here to the collective mode of Afghans’ subjective 
experience of how they make sense of the world based on interactions within 
the host society, its economy, political institutions, natural surroundings and in 
dependence with other context factors. It is the basis for constructing meaning 
in everyday life and the background of interpretation for everyday experiences 
(and thus not static). This collective subjectivity is distinct from, for example, 
the collective subjectivity of members of different host communities. In 
sociology, the concept is prominent in phenomenological approaches and the 
sociology of emotions. See for example Ellis & Flaherty (1992).
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tagonism towards Afghan migrants but just to rein one’s 
children in and make sure they observe rules and are 
secure overall. This imagery creation was most relevant 
during the reign of Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s. Most Afghans 
were poor; they were visible in the streets selling corn and 
chickpeas on carts. The better-off Afghans were traders 
and earned a lot of money due to massive smuggling 
across the border. […] Today, there is also a common 
perception that Afghans are encroaching on the already 
congested and contested employment market in Paki-
stan. However, Afghans are part of the largely informal 
economy that characterises Pakistan, and they work first 
and foremost in niche areas where Pakistanis don’t want 
to take up employment. […] The population of Pakistan 
is divided regarding the Afghans’ presence. On the one 
hand, they feel some antagonism, especially when Indian 
politics comes in, i.e., when they hear news about Indian 
investments in Afghanistan. On the other hand, there is 
still much empathy towards Afghans because many Paki-
stanis—at least in Punjab—have a migration background 
as well (EI-BICC-KM-008-Pak). 
These childhood memories and current observations reflect a 
shift of perceptions from welcome to burden from a Pakistani 
perspective (also: SSI-SHARP-ZA-101-Pak). Throughout the 
last two decades (since 2001), Afghans have been less wel-
come in Pakistan and faced increasing rejection by locals. The 
influence of international and regional politics on host–refugee 
relations, especially events and conflicts in bilateral relations 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, affect the treatment of Af-
ghans in Pakistan immediately (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 85). 
Tensions became tangible, and hostility peaked after the De-
cember 2014 Peshawar public army school attack (see section 
2) that was spuriously blamed on Afghans. Since then, Afghans 
have increasingly been put under surveillance, persecuted, 
forced to sell ‘property’ and assets quickly and below-market 
prices and in some cases, forced to repatriate (peak in 2016). 
Only with the change in government (Imran Khan, PTI) in 2018 
did the tension ease markedly (SSI-SHARP-ZA-101-Pak, SSI-
SHARP-ZA-112-Pak). An academic expert shared his observa-
tions from Peshawar: 
After this incident, Afghans would not come out openly for 
fear of being rounded up by the police and major back-
lashes by the Pakistani hosts. The incident thus very much 
damaged the cohesion that had been there from the outset 
of Afghan displacement to Pakistan. So, today we can 
rather speak of ‘coexistence in tension’ where the friction 
is beneath the surface, with the potential that a small 
incidence could spark major open conflict. In my opinion, 
authorities in Pakistan do not recognise this underlying 
tension, and it will take years to alleviate it, if at all. The 
local population is no longer positive about the presence 
their wish to obtain Pakistani citizenship because they feel more 
Pakistani than Afghan and have visited Afghanistan maximum 
once in their life if at all. In contrast, more Afghans of the older/ 
first generation of refugees seem to be emotionally and physi-
cally attached to Afghanistan, the land, and its people, and what 
they had left behind, so that they would consider return if only 
conditions in Afghanistan allowed it (see sub-section 3.3). 
A substantial share of interviewees across generations artic-
ulated a strong wish to be integrated legally, too (e.g., SSI-
SHARP-NS-202-Pak). The lack of legal acceptance and related 
rights, subsequently arising dependencies on members of the 
host community, the lack of mobility options to work or study 
abroad from Pakistan as point of departure and the seeming nil 
prospects of obtaining citizenship create frustration, especially 
among the young, educated generation of Afghans in Pakistan. 
They feel de facto integrated but yet struggle to obtain a sense 
of belonging because of insufficient acceptance by hosts and 
the government (policies). One way to get out of this situation 
is migration to Europe, which many consider. As one expert ex-
plained, “The incentive is clearly the quality of life in Europe. 
Afghans want to migrate there and leave Pakistan because they 
realise that if they stay, they will need another 60-70 years of 
their lives to legitimise themselves in Pakistan” (EI-BICC-KM-
001-Pak). 
Shift of perceptions regarding Afghans’ presence in 
Pakistan 
The analysis offered in this sub-section (3.4) on Afghans’ 
integration and intergroup relations has so far mainly focused 
on the current situation and recent dynamics. However, it is cru-
cial to keep in mind that both communities share a forty-year 
history of close interaction as refugees and hosts during which 
relations have changed considerably. The reflection of one Pa-
kistani academic expert about memories of his own childhood 
years in Pakistan and the situation of Afghans today provides 
insights into the host perspective about Afghans who had fled to 
Pakistan since the early 1980s. He said,
When from the 1980s onwards, the Soviet intervention 
induced migration flows of many Afghans to Pakistan, 
they were welcomed as muhajirin, a designation related 
to the religious connotation of the Prophet Mohammad’s 
(PBUH) displacement (hijra) from Mecca to Medina. In 
my memory, the name and existence of muhajirin is as-
sociated with places ‘where you work like a donkey’, i.e., 
sweatshops and mines where stones are cut, etc. that were 
also referred to as ‘Kharkar camp’ [khar meaning donkey 
in Urdu, Dari, Pashto; kar meaning work/ labour]. In the 
mid-1980s, rumours spread that Kharkar camp residents 
would kidnap small children, and parents used to tell 
their children that these kharkars would come to get them 
if they do not behave. Such stories were not based on an-
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Given that the local economy in Pakistan is not thriving, 
Afghans are perceived as competitors and local workers 
as a threat. They are perceived not only to have out-
smarted average Pakistanis but also to receive interna-
tional assistance. Thus, the Pakistani viewpoint is ‘We are 
equally suffering, but we are not getting all of this’. This 
feeds into the mood that all security incidences are attrib-
uted to Afghan refugees and has set off a blame game that 
is increasingly mutual. On the one hand, Pakistanis blame 
Afghans to be terrorists. On the other, Afghans blame 
Pakistanis for non-respect and a hostile attitude, amongst 
others (EI-BICC-KM-016-Pak). 
Overall, we detect a depreciation of Afghans’ local integration 
in an increasingly hostile environment.
Concluding remarks
Compared to other displacement contexts, there were only few 
hurdles to Afghans’ local integration in Pakistan in the past. 
From a bird-eye viewpoint, conflicts had long been absent at the 
political and intercommunal levels, large-scale mass deporta-
tions never occurred, and social cohesion was lived due to many 
commonalities. Our research revealed current contradictory de-
velopments in terms of intergroup relations between Pakistani 
hosts and Afghans. On the one hand, the presence of an in-
creasing number of second- and third-generation Afghans who 
were born and raised in Pakistan amid Pakistani neighbours 
and in close interaction with the host community constitutes an 
ideal starting point for closer relations of trust and cooperation 
in the future. On the other hand, political influences and the 
security perspective that frames Afghans’ presence since 2015 
are detrimental to local integration and social cohesion. There 
is the potential for further deterioration and escalation. With the 
mood shifting and increasing ‘coexistence in tension’, it seems 
that it is high time for policymakers and the international com-
munity to review previous community cohesion programmes 
and to engage more seriously in initiatives that emphasise 
shared future-building and improvements of everyday lives. 
of Afghans; so, if something like the school incident hap-
pens again, the situation might escalate and in the worst-
case, violence towards Afghans will unfold. After the 
Peshawar school attack, the Pakistani public demanded 
that ‘refugees go home’ (EI-BICC-KM-016-Pak). 
In the past, both communities were always thought of and 
perceived themselves as having more in common than not. 
Low-income people (EI-BICC-KM-012-Pak) of both nation-
alities faced the hardships of living in Pakistan around the 
poverty line with daily challenges such as gas and electricity 
load shedding, the reported difficulties in accessing health and 
elementary education services (cf. 3.2), realising their rights, 
finding decent employment, etc. However, fueled by rejectionist 
government policies, racial profiling and the security lens the 
GoP adopted for its overall treatment of Afghans in the country, 
negative perceptions soared also among orinary people. A very 
outspoken Pakistani government expert who had been dealing 
with Afghan refugees in an official position for more than one 
decade complained about what he perceived as lack of loyalty of 
Afghans towards Pakistan claiming that “Not a single Afghan 
is appreciating the government of Pakistan and the Pakistani 
people. [...] How to expect that Pakistanis, the common men, 
here love Afghans?” (EI-BICC-KM-003-Pak).
Thus, while Pakistanis increasingly see Afghans as a security 
risk and factor for instability, Afghans experience their own 
frustrations. As one respondent put it, “At the communal level, 
Pakistanis and Afghans share more than what separates them, 
also and in particular in low-income areas. However, whereas 
daily wage labourers who are Pakistanis get 1,000 PKR per day, 
Afghans only get 500 PKR a day, this frustrates them” (EI-
BICC-KM-012-Pak). Another expert pointed out an additional 
dimension: “… the tension between both states is at the govern-
ment level, not between people. When in 2016, Afghans were 
forced to sell their property, the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa gov-
ernment insisted that they should be paid the due amounts and 
not disadvantaged prices. The resentment Afghans feel against 
Pakistanis is not given due attention. In the view of Afghans, 
they have been deprived of resources dedicated to them initially 
but which the ISI [Inter Services Intelligence] and GoP kept to 
themselves” (EI-BICC-KM-001-Pak). 
What can be discerned from the interviews is that the overall 
strong social cohesion that had existed between Afghans 
and Pakistani hosts from the outset is waning for the second 
decade in a row, fuelled by the previous government’s narrative 
that connected Afghan refugees, terrorism and insecurity in 
Pakistani cities and towns. The current government, which is 
keener to acknowledge Afghans’ contribution to the Pakistani 
economy and society, is facing great difficulties in getting rid 
of negative narratives as the population has developed a hostile 
attitude towards Afghans’ presence from 2015 onwards. This is 
confirmed by the explanation of an academic expert:
Key findings
•	 Social cohesion between Afghans and the host society 
has traditionally been high. The intergroup relations do, 
however, not yield emancipatory potential and upward 
social mobility for Afghans.
•	 Relations have moved from support to ‘coexistence in 
tension’ with risks of violent escalation.
•	 Many Afghans are torn between the will to belong and 
rejection by locals. 
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However, two caveats accompany these statements. One is the 
non-availability of quantitative figures for the investments, 
employment rates (of locals) and revenue contributions of Af-
ghans to the Pakistani economy (EI-BICC-KM-001-Pak). This 
is due to two factors: For one, the Pakistani economy is largely 
informal and undocumented. For the other, the legal status of 
Afghans prevents them from owning and registering property 
(land, businesses, etc., cf. 3.2 and 3.4) in their own name, and it 
excludes them from public sector employment. In this regard, it 
is noteworthy to point out that a study tendered by the govern-
ment of Pakistan in 2016 about the impact of Afghans on the 
Pakistani economy has not been finalised and published to date. 
The second caveat manifests in adverse and contradictory 
policies by the GoP that regulate cross-border interactions, de-
prive Afghans of developing their economic potentials through 
denied access to the formal economy (private and public sector) 
and lack a coherent strategy to benefit from Afghans’ pres-
ence in terms of revenue and tax income. The trade between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan is badly affected by volatile political 
relations between both countries that have regularly caused 
day- and week-long border closures. As a result goods have 
perished, entrepreneurs have been unable to fulfil contracts and 
lost orders. In the words of one respondent: “The economic re-
lationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorated over 
the last few years as Pakistan has tightened up the policies for 
the people of Afghanistan. Pakistan is of the view that terrorists 
come from Afghanistan, and this has affected its policy towards 
Afghans and the trade between the two countries, plunging 
people on both sides in financial crisis” (SSI-SHARP-ZA-
113-Pak). 
The recent positive move of the new government that allows 
Afghans to open bank accounts19  and use Pakistani SIM 
cards has clear economic motives, not least to facilitate capital 
movement from business transfers via banks and thus create a 
base from where fiscal revenues can be deducted. However, it 
remains unclear why Afghans are not allowed to obtain drivers’ 
licenses and register vehicles in their name or when insufficien-
cies of the bank account regulation will be remedied. The latter 
are significant as Afghans perceive them to be almost useless 
in some cases because accounts expire with the expiration 
of notification of PoR cards. There is also no mechanism for 
the family of an account holder to withdraw the money in the 
account should the holder die. These shortcomings undermine 
trust in the Pakistani banking system and the intended objec-
tive of the GoP to incentivise formal business transactions and 
investments by Afghan entrepreneurs and to include these into 
the Pakistani tax revenue system. 
19 According to UNHCR (2019, p. 117), by the end of 2019 3,200 registered 




In this fifth theme of TRAFIG, the overarching question is: 
What are the economic impacts of protracted displacement 
situations and transnational figurations of displacement in the 
medium and long-term, and how can policies contribute to 
maximising development effects? 
Ordinary Afghans have found niche occupations in the Paki-
stani economy over the years, such as the scrap business and 
recycling of waste. Moreover, they are construction workers, 
mine workers, cobblers and have a certain dominance in 
the transport sector for goods and people, e.g., as lorry- and 
rickshaw drivers. These are mostly occupations where they do 
not compete with Pakistani labourers—by one of the experts 
referred to as “the odd jobs no Pakistani is willing to do” (EI-
BICC-KM-007-Pak). Larger businesses involving cross-border 
trade are typically carpet-making and international trade, 
dried fruit business and trade, trade in clothes and fabrics, and 
handicraft production. In these and the transportation-, garment 
factory- and the scrap business, Afghan entrepreneurs employ 
Afghans and Pakistani citizens alike. Afghans’ involvement, 
however, remains unacknowledged and informal (cf. 3.2 and 
3.4) due to restrictions resulting from their legal status. The 
carpet-making business is truly translocal in terms of produc-
tion and marketing. One carpet businessman shared that he 
“used to import 80 per cent of handmade carpets from Afghan-
istan and managed the production of 20 per cent in Pakistan.” 
He expressed that 90 per cent of his workforce are women who 
are engaged in home-based manufacturing of carpets for him in 
Afghanistan (SSI-SHARP-NS-201-Pak). 
According to all empirical accounts by Afghan employers, 
labourers, entrepreneurs and experts from the academic and aid 
community, Afghans’ contribution to the Pakistani economy is 
significant and could be expanded further because potentials for 
domestic investments and business development as well as for 
translocal trade are huge (e.g., SSI-SHARP-AI-417-Pak, SSI-
SHARP-ZA-103-Pak, SSI-SHARP-ZA-114-Pak, SSI-SHARP-
NS-203-Pak, EI-BICC-KM-005-Pak, EI-BICC-KM-007-Pak). 
TRAFIG working paper no.7  •  08/2021  •  37TRAFIG working paper no.7  •  08/2021  •  36
For policy-making, two major insights are evident from the 
above: First, a shift in policies—concretely, to regularise 
Afghan employment in Pakistan; to allow Afghans to register 
and purchase businesses, movable and immovable properties; 
to allow Afghans to open bank accounts and obtain drivers’ 
licenses, and the easing of trade policies including adjustments 
in visa policies—would maximise Afghan investment and trade 
and revenue effects for the Pakistani national budget. Second, as 
a precondition, Pakistan needs to establish trade- and economic 
investment policies independent of volatile bilateral relations on 
the everyday level and not driven by a security approach.  
Key findings
•	 Afghans occupy niche sectors in the Pakistani economy, 
such as the scrap business and recycling of waste, where 
they do not compete with Pakistani labourers. 
•	 In certain sectors such as transport, carpet-making or 
-trade, dried fruit business and trade, and the scrap 
metal business, Afghan entrepreneurs employ Afghans 
and Pakistani citizens alike. 
•	 The tremendous potential for bilateral cross-border 
trade is inhibited by detrimental policies and volatile 
political dynamics between the governments of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.
TRAFIG working paper no.7  •  08/2021  •  38
4.2	Classed	protractedness
The significance of how socio-economic status, including ed-
ucational background and origin, determines chances of social 
mobility has been striking throughout the interview responses. 
We observed that belonging to a social class is one main ‘struc-
tural’ factor influencing the risk of continued protractedness. 
It determines vulnerability, dependence and livelihood-related 
limbo (less so legal limbo). We have seen a continuity of social 
class membership over family generations, e.g., where a father 
was involved in the scrap business in Afghanistan, the son 
started dealing with waste and scrap in Pakistan; similarly, in-
dividuals rearing livestock spoke of continuity from their fore-
fathers to son. Pakistan is not a country where the poor strata 
of society can move up and attain social mobility. Only those 
Afghans who already brought with them assets like skills and 
resources were able to establish businesses. However, as long-
term hostile and discriminating policies do not permit Afghans 
to register and attain property in their name or enter the public 
sector employment market, barriers to social mobility are 
strong. Thus, even the majority of Afghans who attained higher 
education in Pakistan are facing social immobility and usually 
remain in the same social/ socio-economic strata. The differ-
ences between lower class and middle/ upper class Afghans and 
the fact that there are hardly any dynamics and intersections 
between these two (ideally-portrayed) groups—except for 
charity-giving and -receiving—point out that protracted dis-
placement in Pakistan is a class issue. The in-class similarities 
between Pakistanis and Afghans are higher than across classes 
of the same nationality. For example, as a long-term observer 
of Afghans’ protracted displacement in Pakistan pointed out: 
“Among Afghan refugees, some are more powerful than middle 
and upper class Pakistanis or members of the upper class in 
other parts of the world; they have relations with influential 




One thread running through our empirical evidence has been 
the prevalence of child labour and evidence of separated chil-
dren’s migration on the one hand, and the inter-generational 
long-term experiences due to the protractedness of Afghans’ 
displacement and migration trajectories on the other. From 
here, the question arises about the multifarious relations be-
tween different generations of forced Afghan migrants and how 
these shape current realities and future aspirations. As Bloch 
(2019, p. 437) noted, we know relatively little “about the various 
and complex ways that the children of refugees are affected 
by their parent’s [sic] experiences”. Moreover, policies tend to 
In section 3, we discussed the five main themes of research 
in the TRAFIG project. In this section, we will look at some 
cross-cutting findings and emerging trends that we discerned in 
Pakistan. Please note that most of these findings have not been 
in the focus of our attention but have emerged from our data 
analysis and merit follow-up research to be better understood. 
4.1	Gendered	immobilisation
Throughout the themes, it has become apparent that while 
women and girls are particularly vulnerable to protracted dis-
placement in Pakistan, they are sharing the burden of income 
generation to a considerable degree, especially among lower 
class households by earning with home-based activities., We 
discerned a trend of increasing immobility (ongoing immobi-
lisation) in female spatial mobility due to the tightening of the 
borders (e.g., closing of Torkham for travel without passports 
and visa) which induced men to keep up relationships with 
relatives, assets and kin-networks in Afghanistan alone and 
by travelling less frequently, on the at times longer route via 
Chaman border crossing. Increased vulnerability to harass-
ment and discrimination of both sexes by the police following 
the non-extension of cards since 30 June 2020 is an additional 
factor why women are increasingly staying home. Those who 
are geographically immobilised avoid even domestic long-dis-
tance travel to visit friends and family in other parts of Paki-
stan. The effect is that women are increasingly excluded from 
translocal and transnational networks of interaction as they are 
prevented from joining their family in occasional visits for wed-
dings, funerals and on family occasions. Women are worried 
about protection and liberties at the same time—the former in 
Pakistan, the latter upon return to Afghanistan, thus consti-
tuting a barrier for potential repatriation. 
On another note, we observed social immobilisation of sorts in 
women because they are the least informed about legal options 
of moving out of protractedness, and usually their access to 
TV, internet facilities, and mobiles is limited. In the words of 
one lower class woman living in Lahore: “We are living as deaf 
and dumb” (SSI-SHARP-AI-415-Pak). Women also experience 
legal disadvantages in matrimonial relationships as marriages 
with and among Afghans in Pakistan are concluded in a cus-
tomary manner and are usually not registered as required by 
personal law. We learned that the non-registration of a mar-
riage can result in severe legal consequences and exploitations, 
especially for wives regarding second marriages and inher-
itance issues. Further research into the legal disadvantages that 
women face will help shed light on the extent to which struc-
tural factors are shaping their situation and which measures are 
necessary to move towards gender equality both in law and in 
practice.
4.	Cross-cutting	findings	and	emerging	trends
TRAFIG working paper no.7  •  08/2021  •  39TRAFIG working paper no.7  •  08/2021  •  38
4.5	Vulnerability	under	COVID-19	
For those Afghans in Pakistan who already grapple with many 
disadvantages and everyday discrimination, the COVID-19 
pandemic has amplified their vulnerability. Three out of four 
survey respondents mentioned that the pandemic has had a sig-
nificant impact on their life. While comparatively few reported 
that they (7 per cent) or close family members (9 per cent) have 
had COVID-related health problems, the restrictions on access 
to education and work weighed much heavier, as indicated by 
40 per cent and 85 per cent respectively. The repeated lock-
downs have caused major disruptions to the day labour sector 
in which many Afghans work. Restrictions on public gatherings 
limit already scarce economic opportunities, demonstrated by 
the closing of markets near refugee camps that employed many 
Afghans living in the camp. Overall, one-third of the survey 
respondents indicated that their economic situation had deterio-
rated due to the effects of the pandemic and related restrictions. 
Additionally, the constant threat of deportation continues to 
have a profound effect on the mental health of Afghan refugees 
who are now dealing with the additional anxiety of pandem-
ic-related uncertainty. The effects of the COVID-19-pandemic 
and those of humanitarian programming in the context of crisis 
will have to be systematically investigated in the future, both 
for registered and undocumented Afghans. 
homogenise ‘target groups’ and fail to address the diversity of 
needs and aspirations among different generations of forced mi-
grants. We demonstrated the differences among first-generation 
(of the 1980s and 1990s) and second/ third-generation Afghans 
in Pakistan, concluding that while the former have an emotional 
and often tangible material attachment with their place of origin 
in Afghanistan but prefer to stay in Pakistan because of insecu-
rity in Afghanistan and perceived better livelihood prospects in 
Pakistan, those born in Pakistan tend to seek movement to third 
countries if they aspire social mobility. The described situations 
of limbo due to bureaucratic procedures of the receiving soci-
ety’s refugee (non)policies shape Afghans’ (non)integration in 
Pakistan—while most of them simply want to belong. However, 
impatience with the unfavourable context of integration causes 
young Afghans to seek to migrate to third countries. Europe is 
a highly preferred destination and is approached in two ways: 
Via attaining a solid education and English language courses 
to avail of legal routes or via illegal channels sought by those 
who are less educated but ready to invest years to secure a legal 
stay by all means (EI-BICC-KM-012-Pak). aft themselves or to 
accuse others of witchcraft. 
4.4	Refugee	rentierism	
We had the strong impression that classed protractedness is 
used by several aid actors in Pakistan to derive benefits from 
portraying Afghans without differentiation as poor, vulnerable 
and in need of aid. This is in stark contrast with the self-reliance 
the research team observed overall (except in the legal sphere). 
And even the legal limbo is a constructed one: Refugee-ness is 
the product of registration exercises initiated and conducted in 
collaboration by GoP and UNHCR. It implies a kind of surveil-
lance—portrayed to be the basis of protection—and thrives due 
to an established aid rentier system that must be nourished by 
ever new ideas and shifts in foci because of the overall fatigue 
of donors, implementers, and Afghans themselves with the state 
of protractedness. Several respondents—Afghans and different 
types of experts alike—pointed to vested interests of ‘stake-
holders’ in the status quo of the protracted displacement situa-
tion of Afghans in Pakistan. The underlying rationale is the fact 
that a considerable number of government employees in various 
institutions/ authorities make a living on behalf of Afghans—a 
group of people the designation of whom as vulnerable and in 
need of aid and protection ensures the upkeep of salaries and 
access to related gadgets. 
The observation of an increasing refugee rentierism in Paki-
stan is not unique to our own findings. In a recent contribution, 
Micinski (2021) argues that the government of Pakistan has fre-
quently used the protracted displacement situation of Afghans, 
which is marked by the deliberate construction of a legal limbo 
and the threat of their deportation as a foreign policy tool to 
extract aid from the international community. 
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Based on the insights of classed protractedness elaborated in 
this paper we hypothesise that the better educated and skilled 
from middle class families have a theoretical chance to realise 
their aims of moving up and out, while lower-class Afghans 
find themselves unable to end protracted displacement on their 
own. This would require the governments’ readiness to discuss 
options for local integration and pathways towards citizenship. 
Another central objective should be to support translocal lives 
through legal provisions in a regional mobility regime, thereby 
regularising the realities of split households across both sides of 
the Afghan–Pakistan borders. Either way, the resolution of legal 
insecurity is the key to ending forced displacement. However, 
even in the context of legal limbo, everyday protection limbo 
and socio-economic limbo, Afghans risk being misrepresented 
as largely dependent and vulnerable, which is not true for all. 
It is also important to consider that many Pakistani citizens 
find themselves in very similar patterns of vulnerability and 
dependency that limit their prospects for social (im)mobility 
and access to services and employment in the country.
Connectivity and mobility are subjected to  
structural forces  
We have found that networks exist but are strongest among 
Afghans, most at the local (neighbourhood, same city) level, 
followed by support networks spanning across Pakistan and 
into Afghanistan and the region (including Iran). Regional 
transnational mobility is more significant than mobility further 
abroad, especially for lower-class Afghans. Remittances from 
abroad play a surprisingly small role as the quality of flows in 
transnational networks is determined by moral support and 
maintaining regular contact. In cases where family members 
have recently migrated abroad, the connection is often lost and 
whether contact can and will be re-established remains to be 
seen in the future. 
Within the region, we detected several immobilising policies 
that hamper connectivity and the upkeep of networks both 
within Pakistan and Iran, but also across the border with Af-
ghanistan. We have shown how this immobility but also certain 
types of mobility—such as re-migration and other types of 
circular migration—are features of protractedness in Afghans’ 
displacement but not a way out of protractedness. Overall, we 
find that the role of Afghans’ translocal and transnational net-
works to end protracted displacement is limited for two reasons. 
One is that social class determines vulnerability, dependence 
and social immobility. The other relates to international (geo)
politics and the security lens employed by Pakistani authorities 
in approaching the presence of Afghans in the country and the 
The central hypothesis of the TRAFIG research project is that 
“the more connected and mobile refugees, IDPs and other 
migrants are, the less likely it is that they end up in a situation 
of protracted displacement. Conversely, the less connected and 
the more immobilised displaced persons are, the greater the risk 
that they are vulnerable, dependent, and become stuck in pre-
carity” (Etzold et al., 2019). How can this question be answered 
when looking at forced migrants in Pakistan and beyond?
Not	in	sight:	Durable	solution	and	end	of	pro-
tractedness	of	displacement	
Our research has confirmed that repatriation and return as the 
only acceptable durable solution by the government of Paki-
stan has not been working so far and is likely to not yield the 
expected results in the future. The governing mechanisms—tri-
partite agreements and the regional Solutions Strategy for Af-
ghan Refugees (SSAR)—lack implementation and are limited 
by adverse national measures and practical hurdles: Lack of 
will related to vested interests, lack of competence, non-un-
derstanding of ‘refugee issues’, increasing rejection by locals 
which results from the politicisation of Afghans’ presence in 
the country and their scapegoating for security incidents and 
terrorist attacks. The complicity of international organisations 
and donors in reaffirming the government’s insistence on repa-
triation as the only durable solution that they aim to implement 
is problematic against these actors’ better knowledge that re-
patriation is surely not the best solution. However, resettlement 
options have drastically decreased as result of the large-scale 
migration to Europe since 2014 and the subsequent avoidance of 
burden-sharing responsibilities of European and other Northern 
countries in accommodating forced migrants. Since the existing 
frameworks for protection and aid are donor-driven, insisting 
on repatriation as the only durable solution discussed serves the 
interests of all stakeholders in an adverse “triple-win” situation: 
For the governments involved (including the Afghan govern-
ment), those commissioned to assist Afghans in displacement 
(UNHCR and national humanitarian and development organ-
isations) and donors (Northern governments trying to avoid 
large intakes from resettlement). However, the data revealed 
very clearly that current procedures administering Afghans 
in Pakistan no longer satisfy the younger (second and third) 
generations of Afghans who feel deprived of options to attain 
social mobility and recognition. As a result, they aspire to move 
to third countries, if need be through irregular channels to 
Europe. 
Conclusions	and	outlook
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Further, at a practical level, policymakers in Pakistan should 
take efforts to establish the necessary formal mechanisms that 
allow Afghans to access services to the extent needed, starting 
in the legal realm with public sector employment, entitling Af-
ghans to have driver’s licenses, register property, then further 
improving access to health services, resolving access barriers 
to higher education, etc. Concrete measures need to improve 
the quality of education for both Afghans and Pakistani citizens 
and ensure that this is accessible for both groups to achieve 
social mobility. While Afghans in Pakistan are de facto inte-
grated into their host society but without the concrete measures 
mentioned here, they lack the institutional basis to achieve their 
longing to belong.  
de facto refugee rejectionist regime resulting from it. Conse-
quently, structural conditions—including ongoing violence 
and war in Afghanistan—largely inhibit Afghans’ move out of 
protracted displacement. We thus conclude that the project’s hy-
pothesis places too great an emphasis on refugees’ agency and 
the potential of their transnational networks. The case study 
of Pakistan shows the weight of structural forces—mainly 
political interests of host, origin and donor countries. Af-
ghans are thus administered not in their own interest but have 
become subject to political capture by the different stakeholders 
involved, with the result that protracted displacement is further 
entrenched. 
How are the findings relevant for policymakers and 
practitioners? 
What the Pakistan case study has highlighted is that the quest 
for durable solutions needs a rethink. A first step into this direc-
tion could be to support more research into power structures of 
the international refugee regime and displacement situations to 
reveal dependencies and the relational shaping and tolerance of 
(non)policies. Another urgent step would be to account for the 
distinct needs of different refugee generations and members of 
different social classes. 
To ensure protection in the short to medium term, the current 
protection regime needs to be revitalised as soon as possible—
PoR card and ACC holders should receive the opportunity to 
re-register and receive longer-term protection entitlements 
and arrangements in the framework of which they can stay. In 
parallel, a mechanism should be found that de-couples protec-
tion from surveillance and control. Such practical measures 
require political will and support for these decisions in Paki-
stani society, including among the political parties and at the 
international level. In the domestic realm, measures to prevent 
a further politicisation of Afghans’ presence in Pakistan and 
resulting rejection by many Pakistani citizens should be taken, 
for instance, by introducing measures to improve tolerance, 
most simply via school curricula and books. Refugee-related 
activities and policies need to acknowledge that the second and 
third generation Afghans will not return to Afghanistan as is 
envisaged by current policy. The governments of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan need to think of how best to ‘make use of’ these 
Afghans for both sides (Gerver, 2019); for example, through 
(local) integration as part of transnational living (Carling et al., 
2021) and possibly repatriation without return (Long, 2013).   
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